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ABSTRACT
This monograph explores the relation between corporate
governance and executive compensation and evaluates the
conditions under which shareholders can benefit from the
right to interfere with the pay setting process by voting
on the compensation proposed by the board of directors
(Say on Pay). The first part of the monograph lays out the
theoretical framework. The second part provides an overview
of the origins and country-specific differences in Say on Pay
regulation and a detailed summary and evaluation of the
empirical literature on the subject.
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1
Introduction
The continuous growth of executive pay since the early nineties has
triggered an intensive academic and public debate about the possible
reasons of growing executive pay levels. On the one hand, the shareholder
value (or efficient contracting) approach views executive pay in public
firms as a means to mitigate an agency problem between shareholders
and managers, with pay levels driven by labor market forces. On the
other hand, the so-called managerial power approach views the pay-
setting process as an agency problem on its own and suggests that weak
boards tend to shift rents to the CEO at the cost of shareholders by
implementing inefficient compensation arrangements.
In a response to the public concerns about executive pay, regulators
have adopted a number of measures to improve the governance and
transparency of the pay-setting process, and shareholder rights to
influence such process. A key development in this context was the
introduction of shareholder votes on the compensation of executives,
also referred to as “Say on Pay.” Since its first introduction in the United
Kingdom (UK) in 2002, many other countries have adopted different
forms of mandatory Say on Pay rules for shareholders of public firms
2
3that differ in many details such as their enforceability, the timing and
the subject of the vote.
In this monograph, we provide a comprehensive summary and survey
of the theoretical and empirical literature on Say on Pay. In the first
part of the monograph, we study theoretically how a poor governance
structure affects the level and structure of executive pay and identify
conditions under which Say and Pay could help shareholders to improve
it. In the second part of this monograph, we explain the origins and
the cross-country differences in Say on Pay regulation and provide
a detailed summary and evaluation of the empirical evidence on the
subject. Finally, we also discuss potential improvements and point out
some fruitful avenues for future empirical and theoretical research.
The core issue among the proponents of the shareholder value view
and the managerial power approach is the question of whether executive
pay in public firms represents arm’s-length bargaining between managers
and shareholders or rent seeking by powerful CEOs. Yet, formal models
of executive pay are typically based on the shareholder value view
and only a few of them explicitly study the consequences of the firm’s
governance structure on its compensation decisions. In Section 2, we
propose a framework that allows us to formalize the consequences of a
poor governance structure on the board’s compensation decisions and
to compare the properties of the contract proposed by a weak board
to the optimal contract designed in the best interest of shareholders.
This framework serves as a benchmark for studying the economic
consequences of Say on Pay in Section 3.
We portray the agency problem between shareholders and managers
as a problem of moral hazard. Different from the standard model, we
assume that the firm’s compensation decisions are taken by the board of
directors and not by the firm’s shareholders. We consider two different
approaches to represent the preferences of a board with imperfectly
aligned preferences. In our model, either the board maximizes a weighted
average of the firm’s expected profit and the agent’s expected utility or
the agent’s compensation is determined by Nash bargaining.
We study the optimal compensation contract for both approaches
under various restrictions faced by the board when setting the agent’s
compensation and compare the solutions with the contract that
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maximizes shareholder value. In Section 2.2, we first show that a weak
governance structure does not affect the performance-based part of
the agent’s pay (and thereby his equilibrium effort) if wealth transfers
between the principal and the agent are unrestricted. However, we
find that a more management-friendly board optimally transfers a
non-decreasing part of the total surplus to the agent by adjusting the
lump-sum transfer. Since the agent is risk neutral, the optimal contract
is a lease contract so that a weak governance translates into a non-
decreasing lease payment. In Section 2.3, we study the optimal contract
structure for the case where the agent is protected by limited liability.
Here, the fixed contractual payment takes its lowest possible value,
whereas the bonus is non-decreasing in the management-friendliness of
the board and/or the CEO’s bargaining power whenever the limited
liability constraint is binding.
In Section 2.4, we study the consequences of two possible forms
of an “outrage constraint” in the spirit of Bebchuk and Fried (2004).
These authors consider this constraint as a natural limit to excessive
compensation arrangements without specifying its details. If the outrage
constraint takes the form of a self-restraint in setting the agent’s total
pay, the board does not adjust the fixed pay component but limits
the agent’s bonus to meet the constraint. If the outrage cost takes
the form of a disutility if the agent’s pay exceeds a certain limit, its
consequences for the individual pay components also depend on their
perceived marginal cost. Particularly, if performance-based pay triggers
less outrage than raising the salary, the board offers the agent a contract
with a lower salary and a higher bonus in response to the outrage
constraint.
A legal reason for a differential treatment of individual pay
components is the “million dollar tax cap” of the Internal Revenue
Code, Section 162(m). This tax cap limits the tax-deductibility of
non-performance-based compensation components to $1 million per
year. Drawing on an earlier result in Göx (2008), we demonstrate that
this rule could induce a management-friendly board to reward the
agent for luck. Interestingly, this outcome would not be optimal in the
absence of the tax cap even if the board maximizes the CEO’s utility
and completely ignores the interests of shareholders.
5Even though a management-friendly board always inflates the CEO’s
compensation level in our model, shareholders must not necessarily suffer
from this policy. In Section 2.5, we present two formal arguments that
challenge this overly simplistic view. First, we show that shareholders
strictly benefit from a moderately management-friendly board if it
has superior information about the agent’s marginal contribution to
firm value. In such a case, delegating the compensation decision to
an informed incumbent board that favors the CEO can yield a higher
shareholder value than an uninformed replacement with perfectly aligned
interests. Second, drawing on Laux and Mittendorf (2011), we also
demonstrate that the need to provide the CEO with incentives for
the search of profitable investment projects can render a management-
friendly board beneficial to shareholders.
The analysis of Section 2 shows that the pay-setting process is a
complex problem that depends on a large number of observable and
unobservable factors. A sound understanding of these factors and their
interplay with the board’s compensation decisions is important for
shareholders and other outside parties seeking to evaluate the efficiency
and desirability of real-world compensation arrangements.
In Section 3, we extend the core model from Section 2 to study
the economic consequences of Say on Pay. In Section 3.1, we begin the
analysis with the advisory Say on Pay model as it is used in the Anglo-
Saxon countries. We show that an advisory Say on Pay can be a powerful
instrument for shareholders to interfere with the compensation policy
of the board. Its effectiveness critically depends on the consequences
of a negative shareholder vote faced by the board of directors. The
stricter the regulatory environment, the higher the willingness of the
board to limit the agent’s compensation to avoid a negative voting
outcome. However, this mechanism is only unambiguously desirable
from a shareholder perspective if they posses the relevant information
to determine the efficient compensation level. Otherwise, shareholders
run the risk to distort erroneously the compensation policy of a board
acting in their own best interest.
In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we study the consequences of two forms of
the binding Say on Pay model as used in some European countries. We
first study the case where the binding Say on Pay vote is retroactive
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and show that it creates a hold-up problem on the part of shareholders
that could destroy shareholder value if the contractual obligations from
the compensation contract are subject to shareholder approval. The
reason is that short-term oriented shareholders have a strict incentive
to disapprove all bonus payments once the CEO has supplied his effort
level. If the CEO anticipates this outcome, he will have insufficient
effort incentives in the first place.
Next, we study the case where the binding Say on Pay vote is
prospective and show that the hold-up problem can be avoided if the
shareholders must approve the agent’s compensation contract before
he chooses his effort level. However, we also find that the threat of
disapproving the agent’s compensation ex ante is only effective if the
shareholders do not have full control over the pay level proposed by the
board. Otherwise, the threat to disapprove the compensation contract
proposed by a management-friendly board is empty because there
is always a contract that yields the same shareholder value without
destroying the agent’s effort incentives.
In sum, the analysis of Section 3 suggests that Say on Pay is a
complex and powerful instrument in the hands of shareholders to
influence the board’s compensation decisions. Its effectiveness and
desirability from a shareholder perspective critically depend on the
incentives and the information of the parties involved in the pay-setting
process as well as on the organization and the legal and economic
consequences of the vote.
In Section 4, we provide an overview of the empirical research on the
subject. Section 4.1 provides a brief history of Say on Pay, placing it in
the broader context of the trend toward greater shareholder democracy.
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 review the empirical evidence on the effect of advi-
sory Say on Pay votes, respectively, on executive pay and firm value, both
in the United States (US) and in other countries. Section 4.4 reviews the
corresponding evidence regarding binding Say on Pay regimes and Sec-
tion 4.5 discusses other issues related to Say on Pay votes. Overall, across
various countries adopting Say on Pay, a few common findings emerge.
First, failed Say on Pay votes are rare, though cases of significant
voting dissent are not uncommon (and are generally more frequent
than on other items voted upon at annual meetings). This may indicate
7that executive pay problems may not be as widespread or that a large
fraction of investors are reluctant to interfere with and micromanage
the pay-setting process. Voting dissent appears to be higher at firms
with excess CEO pay (i.e., high pay and poor performance) and firms
with compensation provisions viewed as reducing pay-for-performance.
In many countries, proxy advisors play an important role in shaping
shareholders’ votes.
Second, with respect to its effect on executive pay, the adoption of
Say on Pay and adverse Say on Pay votes are followed by an increase in
pay-for-performance sensitivity, while pay levels do not seem to be much
affected (though there is some evidence of a decline in the growth rate
of pay levels). Firms often directly respond to adverse votes by engaging
with institutional investors and changing compensation contracts to
remove those controversial provisions that caused the adverse vote (the
specific provisions vary across countries, but the common trait is that
they are viewed as weakening the pay-for-performance link).
Third, with respect to the effect on firm value, most studies document
a positive stock price reaction to events suggesting the future adoption
of Say on Pay (at the country- or firm-level), though the stock price
reaction to Say on Pay-induced actual compensation changes is either
negative or insignificant. One possibility for these apparently conflicting
findings is that investors’ (positive) expectations of the effects of the
Say on Pay regime have not materialized. Another potential explanation
is that those expectations were not driven by anticipated improvements
to compensation contracts but other anticipated side benefits of Say on
Pay (e.g., greater pressure on management to perform well to avoid an
adverse vote; better communication between boards and management).
In Section 5, we close this monograph with some conclusions and
suggestions for future research. Finally, we need to add a few caveats:
first, the research on Say on Pay continues to grow as more data
become available over time and across countries. Thus, some of the
studies cited here are in the form of working papers and their findings
should be viewed as preliminary. Second, while we tried do perform a
comprehensive review, it is possible we missed some studies. Finally, we
apologize if we do not discuss in equal depth all the studies and tend
to focus instead on the work (and journals) we are more familiar with,
including our own.
2
Executive Pay and Corporate Governance
“Properly designed performance measures and executive
incentive compensation schemes are central to the value
creation process. Their purpose is straightforward — to
motivate managers to create value by rewarding them for
the value created.” (Rappaport, 1986)
The shareholder value theory views executive compensation in public
firms as a means to mitigate an agency problem between shareholders
and managers. In this agency relationship, shareholders take the role
of the principal and managers take the role of the agent. The agency
problem arises from the separation of ownership and control (Berle
and Means, 1932). Managers have the right and the responsibility to
take important actions and decisions on behalf of shareholders without
bearing the full financial consequences of their decisions. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) describe the resulting conflict of interest between
managers and shareholders as follows:
“If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers
there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always
act in the best interests of the principal.”
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9The introductory quote of Rappaport (1986) suggests that executive
compensation is at least a part of the solution to the agency problem
because it helps to align the interests of managers with the interests of
shareholders and thereby motivates managers to internalize the wealth
effects of their decisions.
In an influential book and a number of closely related articles,
Bebchuk and co-authors (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Bebchuk and Fried,
2003; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Bebchuk and Fried, 2005) challenge the
idea that executive compensation solves the agency problem between
managers and shareholders in public firms. According to the so-called
“managerial power approach” or the “rent extraction view” of executive
pay, weak governance structures allow powerful CEOs to influence the
decisions of the board of directors and thereby to control the level and
structure of their own pay. According to Bebchuk and Fried (2004), weak
boards tend to shift rents to the CEO at the cost of shareholders by
implementing inefficient compensation arrangements. These contracts
typically exhibit a poor link between pay and firm performance and lack
other desirable features of optimal compensation contracts such as the
control for common risk factors in measuring the CEO’s performance
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001).
The controversy between the shareholder value view and the manage-
rial power approach has initiated an intensive debate among empirical
compensation researchers who seek to answer the question of whether
executive pay in public firms represents rent seeking by powerful CEOs
or arm’s-length bargaining between managers and shareholders.1 Despite
the importance of this fundamental controversy, most formal models of
executive pay are based on the shareholder value view and assume that
the shareholders or a board with perfectly aligned preferences determine
the CEO’s compensation contract.2
1See, e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005),
and Frydman and Jenter (2010), or Core and Guay (2010) for evidence on the subject
and overviews of the empirical literature.
2In a recent survey, Edmans and Gabaix (2016) provide a detailed overview of
traditional and “modern” theories of executive pay. All models presented in the survey
assume that the agent’s compensation is set in the best interest of shareholders.
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In this chapter, we aim to contribute to the debate by providing
a unified framework that allows us to formalize the consequences of a
poor governance structure for the board’s compensation decisions and
to compare the properties of the optimal contract proposed by a weak
board to the contract designed in the best interest of shareholders. In
Section 2.1, we introduce the key assumptions of our model in which we
portray executive pay as a moral hazard problem. The key difference
between our framework and the standard moral hazard model is the
assumption that the firm’s compensation decisions are taken by the
board of directors and not by the firm’s shareholders. We consider
two different approaches to represent the preferences of a board with
imperfectly aligned preferences. In the first approach, we assume that
the board maximizes a weighted average of the firm’s expected profit
and the agent’s expected utility. In the second approach, we assume that
the agent’s compensation is determined as the outcome of a generalized
Nash bargaining model. The moral hazard model combines elements
from Bolton and Dewatripoint (2005, Section 4) and Göx (2016).
In Section 2.2, we analyze the optimal compensation contract
proposed by both board types assuming that the wealth transfers
between the principal and the agent are unrestricted. In Section 2.3,
we study the optimal contract if the agent is protected by limited
liability. The analysis of both sections draws primarily on Göx (2016).
In Section 2.4, we study the consequences of other constraints faced
by the board in setting the agent’s compensation. The first of these
constraints is the “outrage constraint” put forward by Bebchuk and
Fried (2003) and Bebchuk and Fried (2004) as a natural barrier to
excessive compensation arrangements. The second constraint considered
in Section 2.4 is the “million dollar tax cap” found in Section 162(m)
of the Internal Revenue Code that limits the tax-deductibility of non-
performance-based compensation components to $1 million per year.
The analysis of this section draws on Göx (2004) and Göx (2008).
One implicit presumption of the managerial power approach is
that shareholders always suffer from the compensation policy of a
management-friendly board. In Section 2.5, we present two formal
arguments that challenge this overly simple view. The first argument is
based on the trade-off between an informational advantage of the board
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in setting the agent’s compensation and the degree of its preference
alignment with shareholders. Based on Laux and Mittendorf (2011), the
second argument exploits a trade-off between providing the CEO with
incentives for the search of investment projects and limiting the rent
extraction at the cost of shareholders. In both cases, the shareholders
can benefit from a board that partly considers the CEO’s utility in its
compensation decisions. Finally, in Section 2.6, we provide a discussion
of our key findings, the limitations and possible extensions of our model,
and its implications for empirical research.
2.1 Executive pay as a moral hazard problem
In line with a large part of the theoretical executive compensation
literature, we portray the agency relation between shareholders and
managers as a moral hazard problem and ignore other complications
such as adverse selection problems or career concerns. In our model,
the manager must be motivated to exert a real valued effort a ∈ [0, a]
in order to increase the fundamental value of the firm. The firm value
takes the form
x˜(a) = x(a) + ˜, (2.1)
where x(a) ≥ 0 is an increasing and concave function of the agent’s
effort and ˜ is a noise term with mean zero. The agent’s effort is
unobservable and personally costly. The cost function c(a) is monoton-
ically increasing and strictly convex in a, and satisfies the conditions
c(0) = c′(0) = 0. Let
W (a) = x(a)− c(a) (2.2)
denote the expected surplus of the agency, we assume that W ′(0) > 0
and W ′(a) < 0 to ensure the existence of an interior solution to the
firm’s agency problem.
Throughout the analysis, we consider a scenario where neither the
agent’s effort choice nor the firm’s fundamental value are verifiable by
third parties such as a court, and thus not contractible. To motivate
the agent’s effort choice, the firm offers him a compensation contract
on the basis of a contractible performance measure y˜. For the main
part of the analysis, we assume that the performance measure is a
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binary signal that can take the values y˜ ∈ {0, 1}. It seems natural to
interpret this performance measure as an indicator of implementing
an investment project or a merger activity, where y˜ = 1 signals a
successful implementation and y˜ = 0 indicates a failure. The likelihood
of success depends on the agent’s effort so that prob(y˜ = 1) = a and
prob(y˜ = 0) = 1 − a. Clearly, it must be that a = 1 for this model
version because the agent’s effort is equivalent to the probability of
success.3 The main advantage of this structure is the fact that the
optimal contract takes a particular simple form: The agent receives
a base salary w and a supplementary bonus b in case of a successful
project implementation. With these assumptions, the agent’s expected
compensation becomes
s(a) = w + b · a. (2.3)
Let the principal be risk neutral and let u(a) := E[u(s(a))] denote the
agent’s expected utility derived from monetary compensation. With
these assumptions, the objective functions of the principal and the agent
can be expressed as:
Π(a) = x(a)− s(a), (2.4)
U(a) = u(a)− c(a). (2.5)
In this setting, an agency problem can arise for two reasons. The agent
is risk averse or he is protected by limited liability. In both cases, the
compensation contract that maximizes the expected shareholder value
fails to implement the first-best effort level that maximizes the joint
surplus in equation (2.2) because such a contract is too costly for the
firm’s shareholders. Since the source of the agency problem is a second
order concern for the purpose of our study, we will focus on the case of
a risk neutral agent where u(a) = s(a) for the main part of the analysis.
Moreover, as we will see in Section 2.2, the firm’s governance structure
generally affects the optimal compensation policy even in a setting
3For the purpose of the analysis in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, we could have equivalently
assumed that x˜ is a binary random variable and contractible. The main advantage
of our model structure is the fact that the key assumptions are general enough to
hold for agency models with a continuous output such as the linear agency model in
Section 2.4.
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where implementing the first-best effort level is in the best interest of
shareholders.
In the remaining sections of this chapter, we will use various versions
of our basic agency model to study the potential differences among
the theoretically optimal compensation contracts written in the best
interest of shareholders and the contracts that are, at least to a limited
extent, designed to cater the interests of the CEO. This comparison
serves as a framework for studying the economic consequences of Say on
Pay in Section 3 and as a benchmark for our summary and evaluation
of the empirical literature in Section 4.
More specifically, we assume that the firm’s compensation decisions
are taken by the board of directors and not by the firm’s shareholders.
To study the relation between the firm’s governance structure and its
compensation policy, we consider two different approaches to represent
the preferences of a board whose interests are imperfectly aligned with
the interests of shareholders. The first approach has been widely used
in previous literature,4 it assumes that the board maximizes a weighted
average of the principal’s and the agent’s utilities:
V (a) = (1− λ) ·Π(a) + λ · U(a). (2.6)
The parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] can be interpreted as a measure of the board’s
dependence from the CEO, its management-friendliness, or the CEO’s
power over the board’s decisions. Thus, only if λ = 0, the board’s
objectives are perfectly aligned with shareholder interests. Otherwise,
the board factors the CEO’s utility at least partly into its compensation
decisions. To distinguish the objective function in (2.6) from other
modeling approaches, we subsequently refer to it as the weighted utility
approach. For most applications, it will be convenient to assume that
the board maximizes the expression
V (a) = Π(a) + δ · U(a). (2.7)
This objective function yields the same compensation decisions as the
weighted utility approach if δ = λ/(1−λ) and the range of the parameter
4Among others, this structure has been used by Drymiotes (2007), Kumar and
Sivaramakrishnan (2008), Laux and Mittendorf (2011), and Göx (2016).
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λ is appropriately considered in studying the solution of the board’s
decision problem.
The second approach considered in this monograph assumes that the
board’s compensation decision can be characterized as the outcome of a
Nash bargaining procedure.5 Here, the players maximize the generalized
Nash product
N(a) = (Π(a)−Π)1−λ · (U(a)− U)λ , (2.8)
where λ can be interpreted as the bargaining power of the CEO
and/or the board members representing his interests, and 1− λ can be
interpreted as the bargaining power of shareholders and/or their repre-
sentatives at the board of directors. Π and U are the reservation utilities
of shareholders and the CEO, respectively. Unless stated otherwise, we
subsequently normalize both reservation utilities to zero.
2.2 Contracting with unconstrained wealth transfers
The basic version of the moral hazard model imposes no restrictions on
the magnitude of the payments between the principal and the agent.
The shareholder value maximizing compensation scheme is found by
maximizing Π(a) subject to the constraints
U(a) ≥ 0 (2.9)
a = arg max
â
U(â). (2.10)
The participation constraint in (2.9) ensures that the agent weakly
prefers the employment relationship over his outside options and the
incentive constraint in (2.10) forces the principal to anticipate the agent’s
unobservable effort choice in designing the optimal contract. With
unrestricted payments, both constraints are binding. The participation
5While Nash bargaining has found a wide range of economic applications, it
is rarely studied in the context of CEO compensation or formal agency models
where the principal typically has all bargaining power. An exception is Hermalin and
Weisbach (1998) who consider simultaneous Nash bargaining over the CEO’s wage
and the composition of the board. Likewise, Balkenborg (2001) and Demougin and
Helm (2006) study Nash bargaining between principal and agent in the context of a
moral hazard model.
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constraint holds with equality because the principal has all bargaining
power and designs the contract so that the desired effort level is
implemented at the lowest possible cost. The incentive constraint
uniquely defines the agent’s equilibrium effort choice for a given incentive
scheme.
With a risk neutral agent, the optimal compensation scheme from
the shareholders’ perspective takes the form of a lease contract where
b = x′(a), w = c(a)− a · x′(a) < 0, (2.11)
where a = aF and aF denotes the first-best effort level. Thus, since
the agent’s incentive constraint requires that b = c′(a), the optimal
contract implements aF and transfers the full surplus of the agency to
the principal. Taking this well-known result as a benchmark case, we
study next how the properties of the optimal contract vary with the
firm’s governance structure if a management-friendly board decides on
the CEO’s compensation.
Proposition 2.1. With unrestricted transfer payments between the
principal and the agent, a management-friendly board implements the
first-best effort level a = aF. If the board maximizes the weighted utility
function in (2.7), and δ ≤ 1, it implements the lease contract in (2.11),
otherwise, if δ > 1, it sets the salary so that
w = x(a)− a · x′(a) ≥ 0. (2.12)
If the compensation is determined by generalized Nash bargaining, the
optimal salary equals
w = λ · x(a) + (1− λ) · c(a)− a · x′(a). (2.13)
Proof. See Appendix.
According to Proposition 2.1, the preference structure of the board
has no consequences for the agent’s optimal bonus and his equilibrium
effort choice. Regardless of whether or not and to what extent the
board factors the CEO’s utility into its compensation decision, it always
determines the performance-based part of the agent’s pay so that the
bonus equals the agent’s marginal contribution to the firm’s expected
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fundamental value. This compensation scheme induces the agent to
fully internalize his personal impact on the firm value and to maximize
the total surplus of the agency.
However, different from the standard solution in (2.11), where w is
essentially an up-front lease payment that allocates the entire surplus of
the agency to the principal, a management-friendly board can equally
use the salary to allocate a significant part of the total surplus to
the agent. Clearly, any wealth transfer to the agent must satisfy the
shareholders’ participation constraint
Π(a) ≥ Π = 0. (2.14)
This constraint assures that the shareholders weakly prefer their invest-
ment in the firm over alternative investment opportunities.6 The size
of the transfer depends on the board’s objective function. If the board
maximizes the weighted average of the players’ utilities, it makes
no transfer to the agent as long as it weakly favors the interests of
shareholders over the interests of the CEO (δ ≤ 1). However, as soon
as δ > 1, the board allocates the entire surplus to the agent and the
shareholders receive only their reservation value of 0. The reason for
this fundamental change of the optimal compensation contract is the
fact that the board’s objective function is monotonically increasing in
the agent’s compensation if it puts a higher weight on the CEO’s utility
than on the net shareholder value.7
In contrast, if the agent’s compensation is determined by Nash
bargaining, the surplus is split according to the relative bargaining
powers of shareholders and the CEO. A comparison of the expressions
for w in (2.11), (2.12), and (2.13) shows that the optimal value of the
fixed pay component under Nash bargaining is gradually increasing in
6The existence of a break-even condition for capital providers of entrepreneurial
firms is a standard assumption in the corporate finance literature (e.g., Bolton and
Dewatripoint, 2004; Tirole, 2006). Moreover, as Tirole (2006) points out, the contracts
used in the standard entrepreneurial finance model can equally be interpreted as
debt or equity contracts.
7One way to avoid this result is to assume that δ < 1 or, equivalently, that
λ ≤ 1/2, e.g., Laux and Mittendorf (2011). However, with this assumption, a poor
governance structure has no consequences for the agent’s compensation if wealth
transfers are unrestricted.
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λ and coincides with the extreme solutions of the weighted utilities
approach only if one party has all bargaining power. Taking into account
that even the most successful CEOs hardly attain a total compensation
equal to the firm’s market value, the Nash bargaining approach to model
the board’s preferences appears to be more consistent with real world
compensation practices than the weighted utilities approach.
2.3 Contracting with limited liability
As recognized by Sappington (1983) and Innes (1990), lump sum
monetary transfers from the agent to the principal may not be feasible
if the agent is wealth constrained. This restriction generally rules
out the implementation of the simple lease contract in (2.11) and
the use of other contracts with negative lump sum payments and/or
penalties for poor performance that exceed the agent’s wealth. Likewise,
labor market forces might prevent firms from enforcing a negative
compensation regardless of the firm’s performance. In the real world,
the flow compensation of executives is hardly ever negative even in the
worst economic circumstances. While this fact does not exclude that
executives incur losses from previous stock or option grants, a contract
structure that rules out a negative flow compensation appears to be
more consistent with company practice than the unrestricted contract
considered in Section 2.2.
To study how the limited liability of the agent affects the optimal
compensation policy of a management-friendly board, we subsequently
assume that the agent’s compensation cannot fall below w. Since the
constant w ≥ 0 is the lowest possible payment that the firm can
implement in the agent’s compensation contract, it must be that s(y˜) ≥
w regardless of the board’s preferences. Since b must be positive if the
principal wants to induce a positive effort level, the agent’s limited
liability constraint reduces to
w ≥ w. (2.15)
To avoid unnecessary case distinctions, we further assume that for
the agent’s equilibrium effort it holds that x(a) − a · x′(a) ≥ w. This
condition rules out that the lower bound on the agent’s salary is larger
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than the lump sum payment in (2.12) that a CEO-friendly board uses to
transfer the total surplus to the agent.8 As in Section 2.2, we first derive
and discuss the properties of the optimal compensation contract from
the shareholders’ perspective. The key difference between the firm’s
contracting problem in Section 2.2 and the limited liability contract in
this section is the fact that the agent’s participation constraint in (2.9)
has slack because it can only bind if w < 0 and this solution violates
the limited liability constraint. As a consequence, the optimal contract
allocates a rent to the CEO even if the preferences of the board are
perfectly aligned with the interests of shareholders.
The optimal compensation contract from the shareholders’ per-
spective is found by maximizing Π(a) subject to the agent’s incentive
constraint in (2.10) and the limited liability constraint in (2.15). The
value maximizing contract takes the form
b = x′(a)− a · c′′(a), w = w. (2.16)
The optimal compensation scheme is a profit sharing contract. In the
absence of lump sum transfers, the bonus not only provides effort
incentives but also splits the surplus between the principal and the
agent. The higher the bonus, the higher the agent’s effort and the higher
his surplus share. The optimal bonus solves the trade-off between rent
sharing and incentive provision so that Π(a) is maximized. It can be
seen from the first expression in (2.16) that the optimal bonus is lower
than the bonus of the lease contract in (2.11). As a consequence, the
agent’s equilibrium effort under the profit sharing contract, a∗, is lower
than the first-best effort level aF.
Implementing the first-best effort is still feasible but too costly for
shareholders because it requires that they allocate an excessive profit
share to the agent. To illustrate the problem, suppose that x(a) is linear
in a. In this case, paying a bonus of b = x′(a) induces an efficient effort
choice but the firm incurs an expected loss of w. The reason is that the
linearity of the expected firm value implies that b · a = x(a) so that the
agent receives the entire surplus of the agency. While this solution is
8Since x(a) = a · x′(a) if x(a) is linear, it must be that w = 0 in this case.
Otherwise, if w > 0, the optimal contract in Proposition 2.1 violates the limited
liability constraint even if δ > 1.
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efficient, it clearly fails to maximize shareholder value. It is interesting
to compare this result to the properties of the optimal contract offered
by a management-friendly board.
Proposition 2.2. With a binding limited liability constraint the salary
equals w = w, whereas the size of the bonus depends on the objective
function of the board. If the board maximizes the weighted utility
function in (2.7), the optimal bonus equals
b(δ) = x′(a)− (1− δ) · a · c′′(a). (2.17)
If the compensation is determined by Nash bargaining, the optimal
bonus takes the form
b(δ) = x′(a)−
(
1− δ · Π(a)
U(a)
)
· a · c′′(a). (2.18)
In both cases, the agent’s bonus and thereby his equilibrium effort are
increasing in δ if the limited liability constraint is binding. In the former
case, the limited liability constraint (2.15) is binding if δ ≤ 1. In the
latter case, (2.15) is binding if λ < (w + a · x′(a)− c(a)) ·W (a)−1.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2.2 suggests that the preference structure of the board
has no consequences for the size of the agent’s salary but it affects the
size of the bonus whenever the limited liability constraint is binding.
These predictions are exactly the opposite of the results stated in
Proposition 2.1 where the board structure affects the fixed compensation
component but not the bonus. Evidently, the question of whether or not
unlimited monetary transfers between the principal and the agent are
feasible is critical for predicting the consequences of a weak governance
structure on the compensation of executives.
Moreover, the solutions in (2.17) and (2.18) both indicate that a
more management-friendly board grants a higher bonus b to the CEO.
In both cases, b(δ) is increasing in δ albeit with different slopes because
the Nash bargaining solution weighs the governance parameter by the
ratio of the players’ utilities. Intuitively, a management-friendly board
pays a higher bonus to the CEO because it is less concerned than
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shareholders about leaving the manager with a rent and solves the
trade-off between inducing effort and sharing rents with the CEO in
favor of the former. A management-friendly board therefore provides
stronger effort incentives in the form of a higher bonus and implements
a higher equilibrium effort than the second-best effort level a∗ implicitly
defined in Equation (2.16).
Even though the size of the bonus depends on the board’s objective
function, the solutions in (2.17) and (2.18) coincide in three different
cases. If δ = λ = 0, if λ = 1, or if δ > 0 and the surplus is split equally
between the agent and the principal, i.e., if Π(a) = U(a). In the first
case, the board maximizes the expected firm value by implementing
the second-best effort level a∗ via the optimal profit sharing contract in
(2.16). In the second case, both contracts implement the first best effort
level aF but allocate the total surplus of the agency to the CEO. In the
last case, both contracts induce an effort level a ∈ (a∗, aF) by allocating
more than the second-best profit share but less than the total surplus
to the agent.
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, the optimal bonus under Nash bargaining
can be higher or lower than the bonus implemented under the weighted
utilities approach. It can also be seen that the optimal bonus levels
Figure 2.1: Optimal bonus rates. The figure shows the optimal bonus rates in
Proposition 2.2 as a function of λ for an example firm where x(a) = 0.9a, c(a) = a4/4,
and w = 0. The blue curve represents the bonus in (2.17), and the red curve represents
the bonus in (2.18).
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under both approaches either coincide if the board essentially maximizes
the objective function of one player or at an intermediate intersection
point where Π(a) = U(a). Since Π(a) is monotonically decreasing in λ
and U(a) is monotonically increasing in λ, the intersection point always
exists if it holds that Π(a) > U(a) for λ = 0. Finally, the example also
illustrates another important difference between the two approaches.
While the CEO’s surplus share gradually increases with λ under the
Nash bargaining solution until it reaches its maximum at λ = 1, the
weighted utilities approach suddenly allocates the full surplus share to
the CEO as soon as λ > 1/2.9
2.4 Contracting with other constraints
In this section, we examine how the compensation policy of a
management-friendly board is affected by other constraints frequently
discussed in the executive compensation literature. First, we study the
consequences of two possible forms of an “outrage constraint” in the
spirit of Bebchuk and Fried (2004) and examine how these constraints
affect the structure of the optimal compensation contract. Second, we
study the consequences of the so-called “million dollar tax cap” of
the Internal Revenue Code, Section 162(m). This tax cap limits the
tax-deductibility of non-performance-based compensation components
to $1 million per year. Drawing on the analysis of Göx (2008), we first
show that this rule could induce a sufficiently management-friendly
board to reward the agent for luck. Second, we identify conditions
under which this policy is not optimal in the absence of the tax cap
even if the board completely ignores the interests of shareholders.
2.4.1 The outrage constraint
According to Bebchuk and Fried (2004) the “outrage constraint” is an
“important building block of the managerial power approach.” Without
such a constraint, there are no limits to the rent seeking activities of
9The example in Figure 2.1 assumes that x(a) is linear. If x(a) is strictly concave
and w = 0, there is a critical value of λ < 1 for which the unconstrained fixed
payment under Nash bargaining in (2.13) is positive. Since the limited liability
constraint is no longer binding in this case, the board implements the first best
solution using the contract in Proposition 2.1.
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powerful CEOs. Unfortunately, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) do not provide
a clear definition of this constraint but simply state that it represents
the “economic and social costs” faced by the board of directors if it
approves compensation arrangements that are perceived by outside
parties as being against the best interests of shareholders. The costs
associated with a violation of the outrage constraint can stem from
various forms of shareholder pressure, reputational concerns or the fear
of losing the board seat.
There are several ways to study the consequences of an outrage con-
straint in the context of our model. We propose two different approaches
and compare their consequences for the board’s compensation decisions.
The first alternative considers the outrage constraint as an upper
limit on the agent’s expected total compensation. We assume that the
board respects this limit when it decides on the CEO’s compensation
contract to avoid the costs associated with a violation of the outrage
constraint. The second alternative does not require that the board
respects an absolute compensation limit but that it incurs a cost or
disutility whenever the total compensation or certain components of
the compensation contract exceed a given value. To keep the analysis
clear, we study these extensions in the context of the limited liability
model of Section 2.3 and focus on the weighted utility approach.10
Proposition 2.3. Suppose that the board respects an upper limit for
the agent’s expected compensation so that s(a) ≤ s. The constraint
can only become binding if it holds that s(a) > s for a = aF. If the
constraint is binding, the optimal contract takes the form
b = s− w
a
, w = w. (2.19)
Proof. Follows from Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 considering the agent’s
limited liability constraint and the shareholders’ participation constraint.
According to Proposition 2.3, an upper limit on the agent’s expected
compensation can only affect the board’s optimal compensation policy
10It is easy to verify that the Nash bargaining approach yields either the same or
at least qualitatively similar results.
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if s is lower than the highest possible compensation satisfying the share-
holders’ participation constraint. Otherwise the constraint cannot affect
the board’s compensation policy because the shareholders’ participation
constraint is stricter than the compensation limit. The constrained
contract comprises the minimum salary indicated by the agent’s limited
liability constraint and a bonus that satisfies the total compensation
limit. Clearly, the bonus must be lower than the unconstrained bonus in
(2.17) if the constraint should have impact on the agent’s compensation.
As a consequence, the optimal effort level is lower than with the
unconstrained solution in Proposition 2.2.
We study next the case where the outrage constraint takes the form
of an additional cost faced by the board if the expected compensation
exceeds the total amount of s. For the sake of simplicity, we consider a
cost function that imposes a penalty on the board if the adjusted value
of the agent’s compensation is higher than s.11 Let the cost function
take the form
O(a) = i · (w + κ · a · b− s) , (2.20)
where i ∈ {0, k} is an indicator variable that takes the value of zero if
s(a) ≤ s and the value of k > 0 if s(a) > s. The parameter κ ∈ [0, 1]
allows for the fact that the board might face different costs if it violates
the outrage constraint by raising the salary rather than the performance-
based part of the agent’s compensation. In fact, if κ = 1, both forms
of pay cause the same marginal outrage cost, whereas if κ < 1, the
same expected amount of compensation causes less outrage if it is
performance-based. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) raise a related argument.
Based on the idea that performance-based pay is generally perceived as
being more acceptable than a lump sum transfer, they conjecture that
management-friendly boards deliberately use inflated bonus or stock-
option grants to camouflage excessive pay levels. The cost function
11Alternatively, the outrage cost could be based on the realized compensation
amounts and distinguish between the compensation paid for good and bad
performance. This approach could be studied using the modified cost function
O(a) = [i1 · (1− a) · (w − s1) + i2 · a · (w + κ · b− s2)] where ij ∈ {0, k}, j = 1, 2 are
appropriately chosen indicator variables taking the value of k if the compensation in
the relevant state exceeds the relevant limit sj in the case of good or bad performance.
Using this approach allows for more detailed case distinctions but yields qualitatively
similar results as the cost function in (2.20).
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in (2.20) allows to study the consequences of this asymmetry for the
board’s compensation policy without proposing a microfoundation of
this phenomenon.
Proposition 2.4. Suppose that the outrage costs take the form in (2.20)
and the expected compensation level exceeds the threshold level of s. If
δ ≤ 1 + k, the board sets the salary so that w = w and the bonus takes
the form
b(δ, κ) = x
′(a)− (1 + k · κ− δ) · a · c′′(a)
1 + k · κ .
If δ > 1 + k, the optimal bonus takes the form
b(δ, κ) = (δ − k) · x
′(a) + k · (1− κ) · a · c′′(a)
δ − k · (1− κ) (2.21)
and the salary equals w(δ, κ) = x(a)− a · b(δ, κ).
Proof. Follows from the proof of Proposition 2.2 considering the cost
function in (2.20).
A comparison of the optimal contracts in Propositions 2.2 and 2.4
shows that the presence of outrage costs affects the board’s compensation
policy in several dimensions. First of all, the critical value of δ, above
which the board transfers the entire surplus to the agent, increases from
1 to 1 + k. As in Section 2.3, the switching point is determined by the
value of δ beyond which the board’s objective function is increasing
in the agent’s compensation. Since the total weight on the agent’s
compensation equals δ − 1− k if s(a) > s, the board must put a larger
weight on the CEO’s utility than without outrage cost before it transfers
the surplus to the agent. Figure 2.2 illustrates this effect. In the absence
of outrage cost, the shareholders’ participation constraint is binding
if λ > 1/2(δ > 1). With the outrage cost in (2.20) and k = 0.5, the
critical point moves from 1/2 to λ = (1 + k)/(2 + k) = 0.6.
Figure 2.2 also shows how the outrage cost affects the salary and
the bonus. Consider first the optimal contract in the absence of outrage
cost: the optimal bonus given by the dotted black line in Figure 2.2 is
monotonically increasing in λ as long as λ ≤ 1/2 and flat if λ > 1/2. The
salary is flat for all values of λ. If λ ≤ 1/2, the limited liability constraint
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Figure 2.2: Bonus and salary with outrage cost. The figure shows the optimal bonus
(red) and the salary (blue) in Proposition 2.4 as a function of λ for an example
firm where x(a) = 0.9a, c(a) = a2/2, w = 0, k = 0.5, and κ = 1. The dotted curve
represents the optimal bonus in the absence of outrage cost.
is binding and w = w = 0. For λ > 1/2, the salary is determined by
the shareholders’ participation constraint and w = x(a)− a · x′(a) = 0
because x(a) is linear in a.
In the presence of outrage cost, the red line depicts the bonus and
the blue line represents the salary. The bonus is still increasing in λ
but it is strictly lower than in the absence of outrage cost for all values
of λ < 1. The salary is flat for λ ≤ λ but positive and decreasing in
λ otherwise. Both solutions coincide if λ approaches one.12 Thus, the
outrage cost makes the board more reluctant to increase the agent’s
bonus beyond the optimal level from the shareholders’ perspective.
Since b(δ, κ) < x′(a) unless λ = 1, the optimal contract in the
presence of outrage cost implements less than the first-best effort level
even if the board puts a significant weight on the agent’s utility. This
12In fact, it holds that lim
δ→∞
b(δ, κ) = lim
λ→1
b(λ/(1− λ), κ) = x′(a) . With b = x′(a) ,
the salary equals w = x(a)− a · x′(a) as in Equation (2.12).
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observation has two consequences. First, the optimal salary must be
positive if λ ∈ (λ, 1) even if x(a) is linear as in the example because
x(a) > a·b(δ, κ) as long as b(δ, κ) < x′(a). Second, and more importantly,
the agent’s expected total compensation must be lower than in the
absence of outrage cost unless λ = 1 because s(a) = x(a) but a < aF if
λ ∈ (λ, 1).
To study how differentiated outrage cost for fixed and performance-
based compensation elements affect the board’s compensation policy, we
examine how varying the parameter κ affects the optimal contract. It is
straightforward to see that a decrease of κ reduces the board’s marginal
cost of implementing a given effort level. Therefore, the agent’s bonus
and his equilibrium effort are both decreasing in κ. As long as λ ≤ λ,
a change of the bonus does not affect the size of the salary because
it is determined by the agent’s limited liability constraint. However,
if λ > λ, the salary is determined by the shareholders’ participation
constraint. Since the bonus and the salary are substitutes in meeting this
constraint, the salary is increasing as κ becomes larger. Put differently,
if the board believes that the marginal outrage cost associated with an
increase of the agent’s bonus is lower than the marginal cost associated
with a corresponding increase of the salary, it will offer the agent a
contract with a lower salary and a higher bonus to implement a given
effort level. While this observation is consistent with the camouflage
argument of Bebchuk and Fried (2004), it leaves open why high levels of
performance-based compensation should be less prone to outrage costs
than lavish amounts of flat pay.
2.4.2 The million dollar tax cap
The so-called “million-dollar tax cap” in Section 162(m) of the Internal
Revenue Code is a real world constraint faced by public firms in the
US. It limits the tax-deductibility of non-performance-based executive
compensation such as salaries or other cash benefits to $1 million per
year. The rule is one of the early attempts to regulate executive pay. It
was introduced by the Clinton administration in 1993 as a response to
concerns about excessive pay levels and a poor link between pay and
performance. Despite some fundamental concerns about its effectiveness
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and its unintended consequences, the rule is still in place. Göx (2008)
studies the economic consequences of the tax cap in the context of a
linear agency model assuming that the contract is determined in the
best interest of shareholders.13
In what follows, we review the main insights of this study and
examine whether and how the presence of a management-friendly board
could affect the consequences of the rule for the firm’s compensation
policy. In this section, we assume that the agent is risk averse with
CARA utility and Arrow–Pratt measure r. Further, the performance
measure is a linear function of the agent’s effort
y˜ = a+ η˜ + ε˜y, (2.22)
where η˜ ∼ N(µη, σ2η) and ε˜y ∼ N(0, σ2ε) are independent risk factors
that determine the value of the performance measure beyond the agent’s
effort. An important difference between the two random variables is
that η˜ is a common risk factor and publicly observable, whereas ε˜y is
idiosyncratic to the performance measure y˜ and not directly observable.
Examples of common factors that positively affect firm performance
independent of the CEO’s actions are currency prices, raw material
prices, or the market component of stock returns.
Since the agent is risk averse and η˜ is verifiable, standard theory
suggests that the firm should compensate the agent on the basis of
the net performance measure y˜ − η˜ = a+ ε˜y. Rewarding the agent for
changes of η˜ merely increases the agent’s compensation risk without
providing any effort incentives.14 Thus, with a linear compensation
contract of the form
s(y˜, η˜) = w + v · y˜ − z · η˜, (2.23)
it must hold that v = z. Such a contract completely removes the common
risk factor from the agent’s compensation and thereby avoids that he
is rewarded for luck due to variations of measurable random factors
13In an earlier study, Halperin et al. (2001) analyze the consequences of the tax
cap in a binary outcome moral hazard model. They find that the tax cap induces
firms to substitute salaries with a higher amount of performance-based pay.
14Various versions of this fundamental argument can be found in Holmstrom
(1979) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), or in Banker and Datar (1989).
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beyond his control. Lemma 2.1 challenges the standard argument that
common risk factors should always be completely removed from optimal
compensation contracts.
Lemma 2.1. Suppose that there is a flat corporate tax rate τ ∈ (0, 1)
and salaries above w are not tax deductible. If w > w, the optimal
linear compensation contract takes the form
z = v − τ
r
· µη
σ2η
, v = (1− τ) · x
′(a) + a · c′′(a)
1− τ + c′′(a) · r · σ2ε
. (2.24)
The contract always induces reward for luck (z < v). It induces a lower
equilibrium effort (v < vS) if the following condition holds
aS − c′(aS) · rσ2ε < 0, (2.25)
where aS is the agent’s equilibrium effort induced by the optimal
incentive rate vS = x′(a)/(1 + c′′(a) · r · σ2ε) in the absence of the
tax cap.
Proof. See Göx (2008).
The result in Lemma 2.1 indicates that the million dollar tax cap can
induce undesirable adjustments of compensation contracts even in the
absence of any governance problems. First of all, shareholders no longer
find it optimal to remove the common risk factor from the performance
measure. Since z < v and µη > 0, the contract puts a positive net
weight on the common risk factor and rewards the agent for luck. This
policy is optimal because the tax cap raises the marginal cost of lump
sum wealth transfers above $1 million by the factor τ/(1 − τ). For a
statutory tax rate of 40% (τ = 0.4) an increase of the salary raises the
after tax cost to shareholders by 2/3. To make up this increase of the
compensation cost, the firm partly replaces the salary by rewarding
the agent for changes of the common risk factor η˜. At the margin, this
form of reward is cheaper than a salary raise. Since doing so is more
beneficial for a high tax rate and expected reward, z is decreasing in τ
and µη. On the other hand, rewarding the agent for luck increases the
risk premium. Therefore, z is increasing in r and σ2η.
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While the optimal amount of reward for luck is independent of the
agent’s equilibrium effort, the optimal compensation contract induces
a lower equilibrium effort if condition (2.25) holds. To understand the
economic logic behind this effect, it is helpful to consider the role of w
in the optimal linear compensation contract. In the standard case, w is
determined by the agent’s participation constraint. After removing the
common noise from the performance measure, this constraint takes the
form
w = c(a) + r2 · σ
2
ε · c′(a)2 − a · c′(a), (2.26)
where we use the fact that v = c′(a) from the agents’ incentive constraint.
Thus, w is sum of the agent’s effort cost and the risk premium minus the
expected amount of performance pay. Since the sum of these components
becomes negative if the performance pay is higher than the two cost
components, w can only be interpreted as a salary if it is positive.
Otherwise w is a lease payment as in the risk neutral contracting setting
with unrestricted wealth transfers in Section 2.2. Clearly, the million
dollar tax cap can only affect the firm’s compensation policy if w is
positive. Rearranging the last two terms in (2.26) shows that (2.25) is
satisfied whenever w is unambiguously positive.15
To see why condition (2.25) determines whether the tax cap induces a
lower or a higher equilibrium effort, it is helpful to study the equilibrium
relation between w and a. Since the tax cap provides incentives for a
salary cut, it must be that w and a are complements. That is, the size
of the salary must be increasing if the firm induces a higher equilibrium
effort and vice versa. It is easy to verify that w′(a) > 0 whenever
(2.25) holds. The reason for this result is that a marginal change of the
agent’s effort has countervailing effects on the salary. On the one hand
it increases the risk premium by the factor r · σ2ε · c′(a) · c′′(a) and the
reimbursement for the agent’s personal cost by c′(a). On the other hand,
15To demonstrate this fact, it suffices to rewrite Equation (2.26) as follows
w = c(a)−
(
a− r2 · σ
2
ε · c′(a)
)
· c′(a).
This expression is unambiguously positive if the term in brackets is negative. Moreover,
comparing the expression with the claim in Lemma 2.1 shows that (2.25) is satisfied
whenever the term in brackets is negative.
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it also increases the expected deduction for the performance pay by
c′(a) + a · c′(a). If the sum of the first two effects is larger than the last
effect, inducing a higher effort level requires a higher salary. Otherwise,
w is decreasing in the agent’s effort level as it is always the case for a
lease contract where w < 0.
To study how the firm’s governance structure interacts with the
consequences of the tax cap, it is helpful to recall from Proposition 2.1
that the governance structure does not affect the agent’s equilibrium
effort if wealth transfers are not restricted. It is straightforward to
demonstrate that this result also holds for the solution of the linear
agency model in the presence of the tax cap. Regardless of whether
the board maximizes a weighted average of the principal’s and the
agent’s certainty equivalents or the agent’s compensation is determined
by Nash bargaining, the board will optimally implement the contract
in (2.25) whenever the tax cap is binding. However, the interesting case
is the case where the optimal contract written in the best interest of
shareholders is not affected by the tax cap.
Proposition 2.5. Suppose that the board maximizes a weighted average
of the principal’s and the agent’s certainty equivalents as in (2.7) and
that w < w for δ = 0. As long as δ ≤ 1, the board implements the
unconstrained contract so that v = vS = z. If δ > 1 it implements the
contract in (2.25) whenever
w = x(aS)− aS · c′(aS) > w. (2.27)
Proof. Follows from Proposition 2.1 and the fact that the tax cap is
binding if w > w.
Thus, if shareholders prefer a contract with a salary below the tax
cap or a lease contract, a sufficiently management-friendly board will
always propose a contract with a positive salary. In fact, if δ > 1, the
salary is determined by the shareholders’ participation constraint and
designed to transfer the net surplus to the agent. The expression in
(2.27) is the difference between the expected firm value and the agent’s
expected performance pay in the absence of the tax cap. Since this
difference is strictly positive, the tax constraint will almost always be
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binding except for firms with negligible fundamental values. Thus, even if
the firm’s governance structure usually does not affect the performance-
based compensation and the equilibrium effort if wealth transfers are
unrestricted, governance becomes relevant for the firm’s compensation
structure if the magnitude of the wealth transfer triggers a change of
the relevant set of constraints for solving the problem.
It is interesting to relate this result to the main finding of Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2001). The authors of this frequently cited study
provide empirical evidence of reward for luck and find that firms with
large shareholders on the board reward their CEO’s significantly less
for luck. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) take their observations as
support of the rent seeking hypothesis. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) take
the results of this study as a leading example of poor pay practices and
blame reward for luck as a means to camouflage excess compensation
as performance pay. Unfortunately, these interpretations overlook the
possibility that the mechanism that causes poorly governed firms to
reward CEOs for luck in the first place, might be more subtle. As shown
in Proposition 2.1, poorly governed firms indeed reward their CEOs
for luck but only because of the million dollar tax cap. Without this
cap, even a board that aims to maximize the CEO’s utility would never
propose a contract that rewards the CEO for luck.
2.5 Is weak governance always harmful for shareholders?
The analysis of the previous sections shows that compensation contracts
designed by management-friendly boards can differ in many ways from
the contracts designed to maximize shareholder value. Regardless of how
the board deviates from the shareholder value maximizing compensation
scheme, the solution is almost always detrimental for shareholders
because it always shifts rents to the CEO. If wealth transfers are
unrestricted, the board does not distort the agent’s effort choice but it
shifts rents to the CEO by inflating his salary. If the agent is protected
by limited liability, the board shifts rents to the CEO by inflating
his bonus. Even though a higher bonus induces a higher equilibrium
effort, this solution is detrimental to shareholders because it fails to
implement the second-best effort level that solves the trade-off between
32 Executive Pay and Corporate Governance
effort provision and rent sharing in the best interest of shareholders.
Thus, in all the models considered so far, the shareholders suffer from a
management-friendly board and would benefit if they could establish a
board with perfectly aligned preferences.
The reason for this result is that the basic model does not allow for
a friendly board to provide benefits to shareholders. In this section, we
study two straightforward extensions of the limited liability model in
Section 2.3 in which rational shareholders strictly prefer a management-
friendly board over a board with perfectly aligned preferences. The first
extension considers a setting where the board has superior information
about the CEO’s expected contribution to firm value.
The second extension is based on Laux and Mittendorf (2011). They
consider a scenario, where the CEO can increase the firm value by
searching for profitable investment projects before implementing them.
In both models, we make the simplifying assumption that shareholders
can perfectly observe the preferences of the board and replace it
whenever it is profitable to do so. These assumptions might not be
very realistic because on the one hand it is not easy for shareholders to
verify in how far formally independent board members are effectively
acting in their best interest. On the other hand, replacing incumbent
board members is difficult and costly. However, these difficulties do not
impair the validity of the arguments in favor of friendly boards provided
below.
As a first extension of the basic model in Section 2.3, we consider
a setting where the incumbent board not only favors the CEO by
maximizing the objective function in (2.7) but also that it has superior
information about the agent’s expected contribution to firm value.
Suppose that the current board perfectly knows x(a) but outsiders and
the firm’s shareholders only know the expectation x̂(a) := E[x˜(a)].
According to Bebchuk and Fried (2005), this scenario arises quite
naturally in firms with a long-standing CEO where the majority of
board members has been appointed during the CEO’s tenure. In these
firms, members of the incumbent board not only acquire a thorough
understanding of the firm’s business model and the CEO’s role in
creating shareholder value but they also run the risk of becoming overly
loyal and less critical towards the CEO. Of course, shareholders can try
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to reduce the CEO’s power over the incumbent board by appointing
some new directors, but new board members might not only depend less
on the current CEO but also lack the relevant information to evaluate
his contribution to firm value. The optimal solution of the shareholder’s
trade-off is summarized in Proposition 2.6.
Proposition 2.6. If the shareholders are imperfectly informed about the
agent’s contribution to firm value, there is a range of values δ ∈ [0, δ+]
for which they strictly prefer an informed and friendly incumbent board
over an uninformed board with perfectly aligned preferences.
Proof. If shareholders keep the incumbent board, they know from
Proposition 2.2 that for δ ≤ 1, the board sets the CEO’s compensation
so that
a(δ) = max
a
{
x(a)− δ · c(a)− (1− δ) · a · c′(a)− w} . (2.28)
In contrast, if the shareholders replace the incumbent board with a
new board with perfectly aligned preferences, it will implement an
equilibrium effort of
â = max
a
E[Π(a)] = x̂(a)− a · c′(a)− w. (2.29)
Since shareholders only know δ but not x(a) when they decide on
replacing the board, they must evaluate the firm value attainable with
the incumbent board based on their expectations about x(a) and the
resulting equilibrium effort of the board. Let â(δ) and E[Π(â(δ))] denote
the expected solution of (2.28) and the expected net firm value resulting
from this solution, respectively. If shareholders always prefer a board
with perfectly aligned preferences, it must be that
E[Π(â)] > E[Π(â(δ))] ∀ δ. (2.30)
However, since Π(a) is strictly concave in a and â = â(0), it must
be that E[Π(â)] < E[Π(â(0))]. It follows that there exists a range of
values δ ∈ [0, δ+] for which the shareholders prefer the incumbent board
over a new board with perfectly aligned preferences due to its superior
information about the CEO’s productivity.
34 Executive Pay and Corporate Governance
The following example illustrates the result. Suppose that x(a) = θ·a,
c(a) = a2/2, and w = 0. The incumbent board knows θ but the potential
replacement board and the firm’s shareholders take θ as a draw from
a random variable θ˜ with a known distribution. With this structure,
the incumbent board implements an effort level of a(δ) = θ/(2 − δ).
Substituting this solution into the shareholders’ objective function and
taking expectation yields
E[Π(â(δ))] = 1− δ(2− δ)2 · E[θ˜
2].
In contrast, the new board implements an equilibrium effort of â =
E[θ˜]2/2 resulting in an expected profit of E[Π(â)] = E[θ˜]2/4. Clearly,
the shareholders always prefer to have an informed over an uninformed
board with perfectly aligned interests. The expected profit difference
evaluated at δ = 0 equals E[Π(â(0))] − E[Π(â)] = VAR[θ˜]/4 and
represents the value of the incumbent board’s information about the
expected firm value. Since this value is positive and E[Π(â(δ))] is
monotonically decreasing in δ, the shareholders strictly prefer to keep
the incumbent board provided it is not too friendly towards the CEO.
For example, if θ˜ ∼ U [0, 1], the shareholders prefer the incumbent board
as long as δ ≤ 2/3.
As a second example for the existence of possible benefits derived
from a friendly board, suppose that the CEO can positively affect the
distribution of the firm’s fundamental value by searching for profitable
investment projects before the contracting stage. The agent’s search
effort e ∈ [0, 1] is not observable and causes strictly convex personal
cost k(e), where we assume that k(0) = k′(0) = 0 and k′(1) > Π(a) for
all a to assure the existence of an interior solution. For simplicity, let
the firm’s fundamental value equal x(a) if and only if the CEO’s search
is successful and 0 otherwise, where e is the probability of success.
Following Laux and Mittendorf (2011), we assume that the board
observes the outcome of the agent’s search activities before proposing
the compensation contract. This assumption implies that the agent
can only attain a bonus if his project search is successful. Since the
agent is not rewarded for his search effort if he fails to find a profitable
investment project once his search costs are sunk, he faces a hold-up
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problem and exerts less search effort than in a setting where the search
effort is chosen after contracting. Considering this problem structure,
the players’ expected utilities at the search stage can be expressed as
Π(e, δ) = e ·Π(a(δ)), (2.31)
U(e, δ) = e · U(a(δ))− k(e), (2.32)
where a(δ) is the agent’s equilibrium effort implemented by the optimal
bonus contracts (2.17) or (2.18) in Proposition 2.2.
Proposition 2.7. Suppose that the CEO can positively affect the dis-
tribution of the firm’s cash flows by searching for profitable investment
projects before the implementation stage. To motivate the CEO’s search
effort, the shareholders strictly prefer a management-friendly board
over a board that aims to maximize shareholder value. If the board
maximizes the weighted utility objective in (2.7), the optimal level of
board-friendliness is implicitly defined as
δ = Π(a(δ))
e · k′′(e) ∈ (0, 1). (2.33)
If the agent’s bonus is determined by Nash bargaining, the expected
shareholder value is maximized by
δ = k
′(e)
e · k′′(e) > 0. (2.34)
In both cases, the optimal search effort equals e = k−1(U(a(δ))).
See the Appendix for a proof.
Regardless of whether the board maximizes the weighted utility
objective in (2.7) or the agent’s compensation is determined by Nash
bargaining, the shareholder always prefer a management-friendly board
over a board with perfectly aligned objectives. The reason for the
result is that the CEO’s search effort is an increasing function of
the rent he expects to derive from his compensation contract. Since
the rent is non-decreasing in δ, a more friendly board motivates the
CEO to exert a higher search effort and thereby mitigates the hold-up
problem.
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Figure 2.3: Optimal governance structure with search effort. The figure shows the
expected firm value as a function of the governance parameter λ. The blue line
represents the firm value for the weighted utilities objective (2.6) and the red line the
expected value under Nash bargaining in (2.8). The example assumes a firm where
x(a) = 0.9a, c(a) = a2/2, k(e) = e2/2, and w = 0.
The optimal level of δ from the shareholders’ perspective solves a
trade-off between motivating a higher search effort ex ante and incurring
an efficiency loss ex post. Since the agent’s bonus and thereby his rent
are increasing at a steeper rate if the CEO’s compensation is determined
by the weighted utility objective in (2.7) rather than by Nash bargaining,
the optimal degree of friendliness in Equation (2.33) is generally lower
than in Equation (2.34).
Figure 2.3 illustrates the result of Proposition 2.7. The example
shows that the expected firm value is strictly concave in the relevant
range for both board objectives. However, as indicated by the blue
curve in Figure 2.3, the expected firm value takes its maximum at λ =
0.4 (δ = 2/3), whereas the expected firm value under Nash bargaining
takes its maximum at the value of λ = 0.5 (δ = 1). Since both solutions
implement the same vector of equilibrium efforts (e, a), the maximum
profit takes the same value in both cases.
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Even in a simple setting where the role of the board is limited to
determining the agent’s pay,16 there are circumstances under which
shareholders strictly benefit from a management-friendly board. Despite
the fact that a friendly board offers the CEO an overly generous
compensation package, shareholders can derive a net benefit from its
presence as long as the board does not put too much weight on the
CEO’s utility in its compensation decisions.
2.6 Discussion
The analysis of Section 2 shows that even in the context of a rather
simple moral hazard model, the preferences of the board can have a
range of different consequences for the level and the structure of the
CEO’s compensation. The optimal compensation not only depends on
the preferences of the board but also on the constraints that it faces when
designing the contract. Moreover, even though a management-friendly
board always inflates the CEO’s compensation level in our model, it
can be beneficial for shareholders for various reasons. The complexity
of the problem and the large number of (observable and unobservable)
factors that determine the outcome of the board’s decision problem,
make it a demanding task for shareholders and other outside parties
to evaluate the efficiency and desirability of the board’s compensation
policy.
A key difference between our model and a large part of the previous
literature on friendly boards is that we focus exclusively on the board’s
role in setting the CEO’s compensation. On the one hand, this choice
does not allow us to study the interplay between the board’s compensa-
tion decisions and its roles as a monitor and advisor of the CEO. On
the other hand, this setting permits us to keep a clear focus on the
cost and benefits of the board’s friendliness on the firm’s compensation
policy. We also take the firm’s governance structure as given and, except
16Several other authors have proposed models in which the shareholders benefit
from a friendly board. In most of these studies the shareholders either benefit from
the board’s role as a monitor (e.g., Drymiotes, 2007; Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan,
2008) or its dual role of monitoring and advising the CEO (e.g., Adams and Ferreira,
2007; Baldenius et al., 2014).
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for the two examples given in Section 2.5, we do not seek to explain
why the shareholders accept to establish a management-friendly board
in the first place. Of course, there are trade-offs between the different
roles of boards in richer settings that could render a management-
friendly board desirable for shareholders but these trade-offs have been
extensively studied in previous literature and are beyond the scope of
this monograph.17
Finally, we do not consider the role of board committees in setting the
CEO’s compensation. Among the studies that consider the composition
of the compensation committee and its interaction with other commit-
tees are Laux and Laux (2009) and Göx (2016). However, since the
incentives of a management-friendly compensation committee are similar
to those of a management-friendly board, delegating the compensation
decision to a separate committee would lead to qualitatively similar
results.
17A large part of the related literature studies the relation between the board’s
monitoring activities and CEO turnover. See, (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998),
Hermalin (2005), Laux (2008). A comprehensive summary of the model classes and
problems considered in this literature can be found in Laux (2014).
3
The Economics of Say on Pay
Until very recently, shareholders virtually had no direct control over
the board’s compensation policy. Motivated by the public debate on
increasing levels of executive pay in public firms, many countries
worldwide have introduced shareholder votes on the compensation
of executives. This voting right is typically referred to as “Say on
Pay.” According to its proponents, Say on Pay is thought to facilitate
the communication between shareholders and the board of directors on
compensation issues and to strengthen the board’s responsibility towards
shareholders.1 Ideally Say on Pay can help to align the compensation
policy of public firms with the interest of shareholders and discourage
the use of pay practices that favor the firm’s executives.
In order to study the impact of Say on Pay on the firm’s compensa-
tion policy in the context of our agency model, we will briefly outline the
relevant institutional details of the regulation. In Section 4.1, we provide
a more detailed account of its origins and the international development
of the regulatory environment over time. Say on Pay was first introduced
in 2002 in the UK where listed firms are required to submit an annual
remuneration report to an advisory vote at the annual shareholder
1See, e.g., European Commission (2010) or Gordon (2009).
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meeting. In the US, Say on Pay was introduced with the Dodd–Frank
Act in 2010. Beginning with the 2011 proxy season, it requires public
firms in the US to provide shareholders at least every three years
with the opportunity to give a non-binding vote on the compensation
of the executives for which the compensation must be disclosed in
the firm’s proxy statements. In recent years, several other European
countries adopted similar rules. According to a report of the European
Commission (2010), a total of 19 out of the 27 member states of the
European Union have either introduced mandatory legal provisions or
at least recommendations in their local corporate governance codes
requiring shareholder votes on the remuneration of executives. The
report also shows important disparities not only concerning the legal
basis but also with respect to the practical implementation of Say on
Pay, most importantly with regard to the enforceability, the subject
and the timing of the shareholder vote.
With respect to enforceability different from the Anglo-Saxon model
of an advisory Say on Pay, many European Say on Pay adopters have
introduced various forms of binding shareholder votes.2 Moreover,
a substantial fraction of the newly introduced voting rights differ
in the subject of the vote, in that they do not refer to the annual
compensation report but to the firm’s compensation policy or to
the actual remuneration of executives. For example, countries such as the
Netherlands and Sweden have adopted a binding shareholder vote on the
firms’ compensation policies, whereas Switzerland has recently adopted
a binding vote on the actual compensation amounts of executives.3
Since votes on the compensation policy apply to future compensation
arrangements and not to the compensation paid out during the current
reporting period, the different subject of the vote also implies a different
2In fact, 13 out of the 19 Say on Pay adopters within Europe require a binding
shareholder vote. Only 4 countries rely on a pure advisory vote and 2 countries allow
for both types of votes, see European Commission (2010) for details.
3See Glass Lewis (2017) for an overview of the regulatory environment in
Switzerland and European Commission (2010) for the members of the European
Union.
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timing (i.e., retroactive vs prospective vote).4 These observations not
only show that there is no unique approach to Say on Pay but also
that a better understanding of the economic incentives generated by
different Say on Pay designs is crucial for evaluating their economic
consequences.
In this chapter, we extend the limited liability model from Section 2.3
to study the economic consequences of Say on Pay. The analysis begins
with the advisory Say on Pay model in Section 3.1. The model of this
chapter is based on Göx (2013, 2016). The model extension assumes
that shareholders base their voting decision on a comparison of the
firm’s pay level with a benchmark pay level and disagree with the
board’s compensation proposal if the CEO’s compensation exceeds
the benchmark level. Since the bonus in the limited liability model
determines both the pay level and the pay–performance relation, the
disagreement with a high pay level equally represents the shareholders’
dissatisfaction with a poor relation between pay and firm performance.
Of course, the second interpretation is more consistent with the empirical
evidence on the subject but to avoid clutter, we will subsequently refer
to the compensation level when evaluating the desirability of the firm’s
compensation policy from a shareholder perspective.
As it turns out, the economic consequences of the advisory Say on
Pay model critically depend on the shareholders’ ability to determine
the efficient compensation level. If shareholder possess the relevant
information to determine the value maximizing compensation level,
the advisory Say on Pay model always weakly benefits shareholders,
otherwise it can also destroy shareholder value.
In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we study the consequences of a binding
vote and its timing on the remuneration of executives. The analysis
primarily draws on Göx (2013), Göx et al. (2014), and on Göx and
Kunz (2012). In particular, in Section 3.2 we study the consequences
of a retroactive vote and in Section 3.3, we analyze the consequences
of a prospective vote. We find that the effectiveness of the binding
Say on Pay critically depends on the CEO’s compensation level in
4Gordon (2009, p. 337) classsifies the available design options along ....four binary
choices: (1) “before” versus “after”, (2) “binding” versus “advisory”, (3) “general”
versus “specific” compensation plans, and (4) “mandatory” versus “firm-optional”.
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case of a shareholder disapproval. This pay level can either represent
the legally protected minimum pay in case of a retroactive bonus cut
or the contractual payments specified in the board’s fallback solution
after a rejection of its initial compensation proposal in a prospective
Say on Pay vote. Interestingly, a lower compensation level in case of
a shareholder disapproval makes the retroactive vote a more effective
and the prospective vote a less effective instrument for controlling
the board’s compensation policy. However, since shareholders face
a moral hazard problem if the vote takes place after the agent has
delivered his effort, a more effective Say on Pay regime could destroy
shareholder value if the voting is retroactive. In contrast, sharehold-
ers could benefit from a more effective voting regime if the vote is
prospective.
In Section 3.4, we close this chapter with a discussion of our key
findings, the limitations and possible extensions of our model, and its
implications for empirical research.
3.1 The advisory Say on Pay model
Most countries use the advisory Say on Pay model where the shareholder
vote on the firm’s compensation policy is non-binding. It is also quite
common that shareholders vote on the Say on Pay proposal after
the board has decided on the CEO’s compensation contract and the
firm’s stock and accounting performance for the relevant performance
evaluation period are publicly known.
From a purely theoretical perspective, this model has a conceptual
weakness. Since the vote is not enforceable, the board could simply
ignore it even if the majority of shareholders disagrees with the firm’s
compensation policy. Likewise, rational shareholders should not waste
their time and vote against the compensation proposal if they anticipate
that their vote will have no effect. However, this overly simplified view
is clearly inconsistent with the empirical evidence. On the one hand,
shareholders and proxy advisors actively articulate their concerns about
poor compensation practices and an insufficient link between pay and
performance. On the other hand, boards appear to take these concerns
seriously and adopt changes to their compensation policy when they are
3.1. The advisory Say on Pay model 43
confronted with a substantial opposition from shareholders and major
proxy advisors.5
These findings suggest that the advisory Say on Pay mechanism
seems to motivate a certain fraction of shareholders to signal their
concerns about problematic compensation practices and at the same
time prompts boards to propose less controversial compensation arrange-
ments. Following Göx (2016), we integrate these considerations into
our moral hazard model assuming that shareholders base their voting
decision on an evaluation of the board’s compensation policy and that
the board derives disutility from a negative shareholder vote.
More precisely, shareholders are supposed to compare the proposed
compensation with a benchmark pay level s and begin to disagree with
the board if the compensation exceeds s. The benchmark pay level s
represents the shareholders’ aggregate perception of an appropriate com-
pensation level. Since the bonus payment in the limited liability setting
determines both the pay level and the pay–performance relation, the
disagreement with a high pay level equally represents the shareholders’
dissatisfaction with a poor relation between pay and firm performance.
For simplicity, we will nevertheless refer to the compensation level
when evaluating the efficiency of the firm’s compensation policy from a
shareholder perspective.
In practice, this benchmark pay level (or pay–performance relation)
could be derived from the average compensation paid in the firm’s
compensation peer group. For shareholders relying on the voting rec-
ommendations of proxy advisors, s can also represent the maximum
pay level that the proxy advisor would accept in order to provide a
positive recommendation for the firm’s Say on Pay proposal. Clearly,
shareholders might have individual reference points for various reasons
such as their information about the appropriate compensation level or
their tolerance towards high pay levels. Rather than modeling these
differences and their consequences for the voting outcome explicitly,
we portray the voting dissent d ∈ [0, 1] as an increasing function of
the difference between the actual compensation s and the benchmark
5See, (e.g., Ferri and Maber, 2013; Ertimur et al., 2013) and Section 4 for a
detailed overview and discussion of the empirical research on Say on Pay.
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compensation so that
d(s, i) = i ·H(s− s), (3.1)
where H(0) = H ′(0) = 0, H(s−s) ≤ 1 ∀ s, and i is an indicator variable
that takes the value of 1 if s > s and 0 otherwise.6 To assure that no
shareholder rejects the minimum compensation that the firm must offer
the agent in order to satisfy the limited liability constraint, we assume
that s ≥ w.
The board’s disutility function takes the simple multiplicative form
D(a, i) = ρ ·d(s(a), i), where ρ is a non-negative parameter representing
the board’s responsiveness to shareholder concerns caused by the
perceived consequences of a negative vote on its compensation policy.
A strictly positive disutility can arise from several risk factors faced
by the board ranging from a negative press coverage to an eventual
shareholder litigation or reputation costs in the director labor market.
Most importantly, boards failing to react appropriately to a significant
voting dissent in a Say on Pay proposal face a higher risk of not being
reelected. Therefore, the parameter ρ also represents the strictness of
the regulatory environment. The stricter the regulatory environment,
the higher the anticipated voting dissent, and the higher is the disutility
of the board. If either ρ or d are 0, D(a, i) = 0. That is, only if the
board disregards the shareholders’ concerns about its pay policy or
it anticipates that all shareholders approve it, an advisory Say on
Pay cannot affect the board’s compensation decisions. Proposition 3.1
summarizes the consequences of Say on Pay for the solution of the
limited liability model in Section 2.3.
Proposition 3.1. The threat of an advisory Say on Pay induces the
board to cut the agent’s optimal bonus in (2.17). If shareholders are
perfectly informed about the efficient pay level, Say on Pay unambigu-
ously benefits shareholders. If shareholders have imperfect information
about the efficient pay level, Say on Pay can destroy shareholder value
at good governed firms.
6As shown by Göx (2016), an economically equivalent cost function can be
derived in closed form assuming that shareholders have individual reference points
that take the form of a uniformly distributed random variable from the board’s
perspective.
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Proof. See Göx (2016), Proposition 3.2.
The intuition behind the result in Proposition 3.1 is as follows: at
the time of the vote on the Say on Pay proposal, shareholders compare
the realized compensation with their benchmark level and vote against
whenever s > s. Since s ≥ w, the voting dissent can only be positive if
the agent was successful and receives a bonus. Thus, if we normalize
w to 0, the voting dissent is positive whenever b(δ) > s, where b(δ) is
the optimal bonus in (2.17). At the time the board sets the agent’s
compensation, it anticipates the voting outcome and maximizes the
objective function in (2.7) minus the expected disutility from a negative
shareholder vote, a ·D(a, i). The first-order condition of the modified
optimization problem is
V ′(a)− a ·D′(a, 1)−D(a, 1) = 0. (3.2)
It is easy to see from equation (3.2) that the compensation is lower than
b(δ) because from Proposition 2.2, b(δ) solves V ′(a) = 0 as long as the
agent’s limited liability constraint is binding (δ ≤ 1). Thus, whenever
the board anticipates that the size of the agent’s bonus will trigger a
negative shareholder vote, it sets a lower bonus than in the absence of
Say on Pay. Let b(δ) denote the bonus that solves Equation (3.2). Say on
Pay is beneficial for shareholders whenever it induces a friendly board
of type δ to set a bonus within the range [b(0), b(δ)). If b(δ) is within
this range, the pay cut moves the compensation policy closer to the
efficient solution of the agency problem. However, if Say on Pay leads
the board to cut the bonus below b(0), it can destroy value because a
bonus below b(0) induces an inefficiently low effort level.
To avoid this risk, shareholders must be in a position to distinguish
efficient from inefficient compensation arrangements. If shareholders
can determine the efficient compensation level without ambiguity, they
simply need to fix the voting benchmark so that s = b(0). With this
benchmark the compensation of a board with perfectly aligned interests
is approved and all boards that consider the CEO’s utility in their
compensation decisions are forced to cut the CEO’s bonus. In contrast,
if shareholders lack the necessary information to determine the efficient
compensation level, they run the risk to vote against the compensation
policy of a board that acts in the best interest of shareholders.
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As shown in Göx (2016), this problem can arise if shareholders can
neither determine the agent’s marginal contribution to firm value nor
the management-friendliness of the board. Since b(δ) increases in x′(a)
and in δ, shareholders cannot determine if the size of the bonus simply
reflects the optimal compensation of a highly productive agent or a
generous pay package for a mediocre CEO granted by a friendly board.
In such a setting, shareholders still benefit from dampening the average
board’s incentives to overpay the agent by voting against the Say on
Pay proposal. However, since shareholders cannot identify the efficient
compensation level for a given marginal productivity of the agent, the
shareholder vote on the CEO’s compensation will motivate the board
to cut the agent’s compensation regardless of whether or not the size
of the bonus is justified by the agent’s productivity or caused by a
management-friendly compensation policy.
To see the economic consequences of this problem, suppose that
shareholders estimate the efficient bonus so that b̂(0) < b(0). This
scenario could arise if the agent’s unknown productivity is above average
but b̂(0) must be determined on the basis of the expected productivity
of all agents. If the firm’s shareholders base their voting decision on
their estimate so that s = b̂(0), even a board acting in the best interest
of shareholders faces the threat of a negative shareholder vote and cuts
the CEO’s bonus from b(0) to b(0). In this case, Say on Pay destroys
shareholder value. On the other hand, if b̂(0) > b(0), shareholders fail to
challenge the compensation policy of some moderately friendly boards
and Say on Pay becomes less effective than it could be in the presence
of full information.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the problem. In the absence of Say on Pay, the
board sets the optimal bonus equal to b(δ) as defined in Equation (2.17).
This solution is depicted by the red curve. Consistent with the example
in Figure 2.1, the bonus is an increasing function of δ and takes its
maximum at δ = 1, the point where the shareholders’ participation
constraint is binding. If shareholders are allowed to vote on the CEO’s
compensation, the optimal bonus depends on their ability to determine
the efficient bonus level b(0). It is found at the point where the red curve
crosses the vertical axis and takes the value of 0.45. If shareholders
possess the required information to determine b(0), they begin to vote
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δ+
Figure 3.1: Optimal bonus with advisory Say on Pay. The figure compares the
optimal bonus of the limited liability model in (2.17), given by the red line, with the
optimal bonus in the presence of Say on Pay. The dotted line in green depicts the
bonus with the efficient reference point s = b(0). The dashed line in blue depicts
the bonus with a reference below s. The example assumes a firm where x(a) = 0.9a,
c(a) = a2/2, d(a, i) = i · (s− s)2, ρ = 0.7, and w = 0.
against compensation levels above 0.45. The prospect of a negative
shareholder vote motivates the board to cut the bonus to b(δ) for all
compensation levels above b(0). The new bonus is given by the dotted
curve in green. Since b(δ) < b(δ) for δ ∈ (0, 1.78), the shareholders with
friendly boards in this range strictly benefit from Say on Pay, whereas
firms with boards outside this range realize the same value as in the
absence of Say on Pay.
If the shareholders underestimate b(0), the voting begins at the
estimated benchmark pay level b̂(0). In the example, we assume that
b̂(0) = 0.25. The voting pattern induced by the lower reference point is
more aggressive and induces all boards with δ ∈ [0, 2.23) to perform a
bonus cut. The resulting bonus is depicted by the dashed line in blue.
Since the bonus cut is higher than with a perfectly adjusted reference
point, all firm’s with boards in the range [δ+, 2.23) strictly benefit from
this solution. However, it can also been seen that the shareholders of
firms with moderately friendly boards, where δ ∈ [0, δ+), suffer a strict
loss from this policy because the board implements less than the efficient
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effort level. Thus, Say on Pay is not only an effective means to discipline
the compensation policy of poorly governed firms but it can also be a
potential threat for firms with good governance structure and thereby
destroy shareholder value.
3.2 A retroactive binding Say on Pay model
A number of European countries did not follow the Anglo-Saxon
approach of an advisory voting regime and adopted a binding Say
on Pay. While most binding Say on Pay models require an approval of
the firm’s remuneration policy, Switzerland voted for the introduction of
a binding shareholder vote on the remuneration amounts of executives
in 2013. Following the public referendum, the Swiss Federal Government
introduced an “Ordinance against excessive compensation” in 2015 in
which the binding Say on Pay became mandatory for public firms. The
Ordinance left open if the vote should take place in advance of or after
the relevant reporting period. While the majority of firms adopted a
prospective approval of the compensation amounts (combined with a
retroactive advisory vote on the remuneration report at the general
assembly), other firms opted for a retroactive vote.7 In this section, we
briefly discuss the potential consequences of the latter approach. The
economic consequences of a prospective voting regime will be discussed
in Section 3.3. Thus, as in Section 3.1, we continue to assume that the
vote takes place after the compensation contract has been signed and
the firm’s results are realized but before the agent’s compensation is
paid out.
With a binding vote, the board can only pay out the intended com-
pensation to the agent if shareholders approve the payment, otherwise
the agent’s compensation needs to be adjusted. As a practical matter,
this type of regulation requires that the board closes all compensation
contracts subject to later shareholder approval in order to avoid the
payment of damages in case of a negative shareholder vote. Otherwise,
the CEO could sue the firm for the payment of his contractual claims.
7See Ethos (2016) or Glass Lewis (2017) for details. Interestingly, both proxy
advisor firms recommend the use of prospective votes on salaries but retroactive
votes on annual bonus payouts.
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To study the consequences of a binding Say on Pay within our model
framework, we assume that the shareholders can effectively refuse the
payout of any compensation exceeding an exogenously given amount of
m, provided that the majority of the votes are cast against the Say on
Pay proposal. The amount m defines the legal protection standard of
the CEO. On the one hand it determines the extent to which Say on
Pay can overrule existing compensation arrangements, and on the other
hand it limits the amount of compensation that can be granted without
shareholder approval. For example, if m = w, all bonus payments are
subject to prior shareholder approval, whereas if m > w, the CEO
is essentially in a position to enforce a part of her bonus awards by
legal action. To assure that the contract is feasible, we assume that
m ≥ w. Consequently, a binding Say on Pay can only affect the firm’s
compensation policy if the agent’s effort yields a high performance.
As in Section 3.1, the analysis of the players’ equilibrium strategies
starts with the shareholders’ voting decision. Since the vote takes place
after the agent has supplied his effort, the firm’s shareholders face a
moral hazard problem. If they approve the bonus, they must pay an
amount of b(δ)+w. If they refuse it, they must only pay a compensation
of m. It follows that rational shareholders are strictly better off if they
refuse any compensation exceeding m. For compensation levels below
m, shareholders face the same problem as with an advisory Say on Pay.
The consequences of the shareholder vote on the agent’s compensation
and the expected firm profit are summarized in Proposition 3.2.
Proposition 3.2. A retroactive and binding Say on Pay effectively
constrains the board’s compensation policy. If s > m, the optimal bonus
equals b = m−w, the agent’s equilibrium effort is a, and the firm’s profit
becomes Π(a). Let Π(a(δ)) and a(δ) denote the expected firm profit and
the agent’s equilibrium effort in the absence of Say on Pay, respectively.
If a(0) ≤ a < a(δ), it holds that Π(a(0)) ≥ Π(a) > Π(a(δ)) so that a
binding Say on Pay adds shareholder value. If a < a(0) a binding Say
on Pay increases shareholder value if Π(a) > Π(a(δ)) but it destroys
shareholder value if Π(a) < Π(a(δ)). Finally, if a > a(1) a retroactive
and binding Say on Pay has no impact on the board’s compensation
policy.
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The enforceability of the shareholder vote on the Say on Pay proposal
can only affect the players’ equilibrium strategies if the legal protection
standards are low. Particularly, if m > s, the board implements the
same contract as with advisory Say on Pay. If s > m, shareholders
can threaten the board to cut the agent’s bonus to b whenever s > m.
A rational board of directors anticipates the credibility of this threat
and reduces the contractually specified bonus to b. This strategy avoids
that the same equilibrium outcome is realized as the consequence of a
rejected Say on Pay proposal. In equilibrium, the threat of a retroactive
bonus cut is never carried out because implementing the same solution
ex ante avoids the disutility from a negative shareholder vote.
Faced with a contractual bonus of b, the CEO reduces his effort to
a = c′−1(b). Since b is increasing in m, the agent’s effort is a function
of the legal protection standard. The higher (lower) the amount of the
agent’s compensation that can be granted without shareholder approval,
the higher (lower) his equilibrium effort. The agent’s effort level is lower
than the equilibrium effort in the absence of Say on Pay whenever
b < b(δ), where b(δ) is the optimal bonus in the absence of Say on Pay
defined in Equation (2.17). As long as b(0) ≤ b < b(1) shareholders
benefit from this outcome because the solution of the agency problem
moves closer towards the value maximizing effort level a(0).
The situation changes if the legal protection standards are sufficiently
low so that b < b(0). In this case, a retroactive and binding Say on Pay
does not necessarily benefit shareholders because it forces the board
to implement an inefficiently low effort level. Since the firm’s profit
function is strictly concave in a and takes its maximum at a(0), it holds
that Π(a) < Π(a(0)) because the agent’s equilibrium effort is lower than
the effort level that maximizes shareholder value.
However, since the effort level induced by the board in the absence
of Say on Pay is larger than the optimal effort level, it also holds
that Π(a(δ)) < Π(a(0)). Thus, with low legal protection standards, a
retroactive and binding Say on Pay can only benefit shareholders if
the loss from inducing an excessive equilibrium effort in the absence
of Say on Pay outweighs the loss from an immoderate effort reduction
in the presence of Say on Pay. Therefore, a retroactive and binding
Say on Pay destroys shareholder value whenever Π(a) < Π(a(δ)) and it
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adds shareholder value whenever Π(a) > Π(a(δ)). The former scenario
is more likely if the legal protection standards (m) are low and the
management-friendliness of the board (δ) is moderate, whereas the
latter scenario is more likely if the board’s compensation policy mainly
caters the interests of the CEO and moderate legal standards insure
the CEO against exaggerated bonus cuts.
The analysis shows that a binding Say on Pay can be more effective
than an advisory vote for controlling the level of board dependence and
thereby the CEO’s compensation. The consequences of a binding Say
on Pay crucially depend on the legal protection standard of the CEO.
If m is high so that shareholders cannot impair existing contractual
arrangement between the board and the CEO, a binding Say on Pay
offers no advantage over an advisory vote. For lower values of m,
a binding Say on Pay becomes an effective control mechanism for
shareholders. However, this mechanism can also become too rigid and
impair the agent’s effort incentives. In the worst case (m = w), the agent
exerts no effort because the prospect of a retroactive pay cut by the firm’s
shareholders prompts the board to remove any bonus payment from
the agent’s compensation contract. In this case, the binding Say on Pay
regime destroys shareholder unless the board designs the compensation
contract in the absence of Say on Pay so that the entire surplus of the
agency is transferred to the CEO.
3.3 A prospective binding Say on Pay model
In this section, we briefly study the potential consequences of a prospec-
tive and binding shareholder vote on the remuneration of the CEO. The
moral hazard problem caused by a retroactive vote can basically be
avoided if the vote on the compensation takes place before the board
signs the compensation contract with the agent.8 This simple change of
the decision sequence avoids that shareholders are tempted to adjust the
agent’s prospective compensation after he has taken his effort decision
and thereby secures the agent’s contractual claims.
8In fact, some European countries such as the Netherlands or Sweden have recently
adopted a pre-contractual (i.e., prospective) binding Say on Pay, see European
Commission (2010) for details.
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Different from the previous analysis, the shareholders vote on the
board’s contract proposal for the relevant performance evaluation period
before the agent’s compensation contract is signed. Based on the
voting outcome, the board decides on the revision of the contract
offer and proposes a potentially revised compensation contract to the
CEO. Provided that shareholders can only accept or reject the board’s
compensation proposal but not determine the details of the contract,
it is necessary to define the board’s fallback position for a shareholder
disapproval in a binding vote. To keep the analysis comparable to
Section 3.2, we assume that in case of a shareholder disapproval, the
board revises the contract so that it comprises a salary of w and bonus
of b ∈ [0, b(0)), where b(0) is the bonus that implements the value
maximizing effort level.
Since the agent’s effort choice for a given bonus contract is not
affected by the pre-contractual vote, it suffices to begin the analysis
with the shareholders’ voting decision. Suppose that the board makes
a compensation proposal specifying a salary of w and an arbitrary
bonus b◦. Different from a post-contractual (retroactive) Say on Pay,
shareholders must vote on the contract proposal before they know the
firm’s result and the agent’s final compensation. The modified timing
fundamentally changes the consequences of the binding vote.
Proposition 3.3. The effectiveness of a prospective and binding Say on
Pay critically depends on the size of the bonus in the fallback solution.
The lower b, the lower is the effectiveness of Say on Pay in constraining
the board’s compensation policy.
Proof. The key difference between a retroactive and prospective vote is
that shareholders cannot breach contracts in the latter case because the
vote takes place before the contract is signed. At the time of the vote,
rational shareholders compare the economic consequences of accepting
the board’s contract proposal with the consequences of a rejection. Let
a◦ and a denote the effort levels induced by the board’s initial bonus
proposal b◦ and fallback solution b, respectively. Clearly it must be that
a◦ ≥ a because otherwise the board always implements the fallback
solution. Whenever Π(a◦) ≥ Π(a), shareholders accept the board’s
contract proposal, otherwise they refuse it.
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Since Π(a) is strictly concave in a and takes its maximum at a =
a(0) > a, there is a range of effort levels so that a ∈ [a, a+] where
shareholders benefit from accepting the board’s initial proposal. Due to
the concavity of the shareholder’s objective function, the critical value
of a+ is larger than a(0) and found at the point where Π(a+) = Π(a).
Moreover, the concavity of the objective function also implies that the
range of acceptable bonus proposal becomes larger as b becomes smaller.
In other words, the smaller b, the higher the shareholders’ willingness
to tolerate that the board favors the CEO in its compensation decisions.
If b = 0, the shareholders are even indifferent between accepting and
refusing a bonus of b(1) because in both cases, their expected utility
equals 0. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, shareholders benefit the least
from a prospective vote on executive pay if they have full control about
the size of the agent’s bonus.9
3.4 Discussion
Our analysis shows that Say on Pay is a complex and potentially
powerful instrument that allows shareholders to influence the compen-
sation policy of the board. Its effectiveness and its desirability from
a shareholder perspective critically depend on the incentives and the
information of the parties involved in the pay-setting process as well
as on the organization and the legal and economic consequences of the
vote.
The model of Section 3.1 suggests that the effectiveness of the Anglo-
Saxon advisory Say on Pay model depends not only on the responsiveness
of the board to the shareholders’ concerns about its compensation policy
but also on the shareholders’ ability to determine the value maximizing
compensation contract. If shareholders lack important information about
the firm’s production model and the degree to which the board considers
the CEO’s interests in its compensation decisions, they can hardly
9Clearly, if shareholders were allowed to make their own bonus proposals, they
could force the board to set the bonus that maximizes their utility. However, assuming
that shareholders are able to determine the details of the CEO’s compensation
contract would lead the idea of Say on Pay to the point of absurdity. See Göx and
Kunz (2012) for a detailed discussion of this problem.
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evaluate the efficiency of the board’s compensation policy and make an
informed voting decision. Since acquiring the required information is
difficult and typically too costly as compared to the prospective benefits,
small individual shareholders will typically have little or no incentives to
become better informed. This problem is similar to the problem of the
rationally uninformed voter in a democracy laid out by Downs (1957).10
Most institutional investors such as mutual funds or pension funds
usually rely on the advice of proxy advisors to take an informed
voting decision. Since proxy advisors are paid to provide voting rec-
ommendations for a large number of institutional investors, it seems
natural to assume that their marginal benefit of acquiring the required
information to develop a well informed vote is larger than for individual
shareholders. However, whenever the information acquired by a proxy
advisor is noisy, it is not excluded that he issues a voting decision
that diminishes shareholder value despite his superior information
acquisition effort. Since a large fraction of shareholders typically follows
the recommendation of the proxy advisor, the consequences of an
uninformed voting decision are likely to be exacerbated in this case.
So far, the research on the role of proxy advisors in determining
executive pay is mainly empirical. Malenko and Malenko (2018) and
Matsusaka and Ozbas (2017) are among the few theoretical papers
that study the role of proxy advisors as a source of information for
shareholders without explicitly examining compensation issues. Malenko
and Malenko (2018) study a setting where shareholders can buy a
recommendation from a proxy advisor prior to acquiring their own
information and before voting on a proposal at the general shareholder
meeting. They find that the presence of the proxy advisor can crowd
10As shown by Levit and Malenko (2011), non-binding shareholder proposals can
also serve as a mechanism for conveying the expectations of shareholders to the firm.
These authors study a model, where shareholders receive private signals about the
value of a proposal that can be implemented by an uninformed CEO. Since the vote
takes place before the CEO decides on the proposal, he can condition his decision on
the voting outcome and make an informed choice. In line with these results, Say on
Pay can also be thought of as a channel to communicate shareholders’ expectations
about the firm’s compensation policy to the board and thereby help it in making
better informed compensation decisions.
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out the information acquisition activities of shareholders, result in a
less informed voting outcome, and reduce firm value.
Matsusaka and Ozbas (2017) study the usefulness of proxy advice
under different degrees of shareholder empowerment without modeling
the proxy advisor as a strategic player. Shareholders can either have
binding approval rights (i.e., approve or reject a management proposal)
or proposal rights (i.e., force the firm to adopt a strategy change
proposed by a blockholder). Since shareholders lack the information
to evaluate the economic consequences of the proposals, they base
their voting decision on the noisy signal provided by a third party.11
Matsusaka and Ozbas (2017) show that proposal rights can cause value-
maximizing managers to take value-reducing actions to accommodate
activist investors with non-value-maximizing goals. In contrast, approval
rights (such as a binding Say on Pay vote) weakly benefit shareholders
in their setting. On the one hand, they limit the manager’s ability to
pursue private benefits at shareholder expense. On the other hand, they
have minimal impact on managerial actions and firm value because the
manager in effect can threaten shareholders with an undesirable status
quo if they do not approve the manager’s proposed action.
The analysis of Sections 3.2 and 3.3 shows that the consequences of
the binding approval rights depend on both the CEO’s pay level in case
of a disapproval and on the time of the vote. If the vote on the Say on
Pay proposal is taken retroactively, it can cause a hold-up problem that
destroys shareholder value. A limitation of this model is that it does
not consider long-term oriented shareholders. Established equilibrium
concepts for repeated games show that hold-up problems in one shot
games can theoretically be solved if the players are allowed to interact
repeatedly over a multi-period planning horizon with unknown end.12
Göx et al. (2014) examine this hypothesis in a laboratory experiment
where a privately informed CEO with limited control over his own
compensation level must implement a risky investment project.
11As suggested by the Matsusaka and Ozbas (2017), such a signal could be
provided by a proxy advisor. However, assuming that the source of information is an
arbitrary third party such as a large institutional investor or an investment analyst
would not change the results of the model.
12See, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Section 5.
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Göx et al. (2014) find that a retroactive binding Say on Pay is
an effective means to limit the CEO’s excess compensation but it
equally destroys firm value because the CEO anticipates that rational
shareholders will use the Say on Pay vote to cut his compensation
even after successfully implementing a positive NPV project. Perhaps
surprisingly, Göx et al. (2014) find that this hold-up problem is equally
pronounced in a one shot game and in a repeated game with an unknown
end. Since there is little evidence on the consequences of binding Say
on Pay votes (see Section 4.4), it is an open issue how the length of
the shareholders’ planning horizon effectively determines the economic
consequences of a binding Say on Pay vote.
4
Empirical Evidence: Fifty Shades of Say on Pay
The purpose of this chapter is to review the empirical research on the
economic impact of Say on Pay. The chapter is organized around five
sections. Section 4.1 provides a brief history of Say on Pay, placing
its roots in the broader context of a gradual shift toward a more
shareholder-centric governance system. The rich set of legislative events
accompanying the adoption of Say on Pay in many countries has
provided fertile ground for empirical studies. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 review
the evidence in such studies, focusing on the effect of advisory Say on Pay
votes, respectively, on executive pay and firm value. Section 4.4 reviews
the corresponding evidence regarding binding Say on Pay regimes.
Section 4.5 discusses studies examining other issues related to Say on
Pay.1
4.1 A brief history of Say on Pay
While making headlines for many decades (Murphy, 2012), CEO pay
has become a recurring topic of debate during the New Economy of the
1This chapter draws on a previous review of the empirical research on Say on
Pay in Ferri (2015). In addition to reviewing recent studies not examined in Ferri
(2015), this chapter devotes more attention to the international evidence.
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nineties, when the growing use of stock options as incentive tool (favored
by a benign accounting treatment) led to a rapid increase in CEO pay
(the average CEO-to-worker pay ratio peaked at more than 400 in 2000,
up from 18 in 1965; Mishel and Sabadish, 2012). As the dot-com bubble
burst and a series of accounting and governance scandals unfolded in
2001–2002 (e.g., Worldcom, Enron), stock options and executive pay
were blamed for providing perverse incentives to manipulate financial
reports and the stock price. These scandals led many institutional
investors to take a more active role in monitoring corporations, spurring
a wave of shareholder activism and a new industry of governance
intermediaries (governance ratings agencies, proxy advisors). At the
same time, influential academic studies documented a large impact of
governance quality on firm value (Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al.,
2009) and calls for policy reforms empowering shareholders became
louder (Bebchuk, 2005).
Like other institutional investors, union pension funds began to
take a more active role. Because these funds tend to be well diversified,
holding very small stakes in thousands of firms, they could not exert their
influence by buying large stakes in individual firms. Hence they resorted
to “low-cost” tools of activism (Ferri, 2012), such as shareholder propos-
als and shareholder votes on uncontested director elections.2 Between
2003 and 2010, led by union pension funds’ efforts, the frequency of,
and voting support for, compensation-related shareholder proposals
and compensation-related “vote-no” campaigns against directors up
for election increased quickly. Among S&P 1500 firms, there were
approximately 66 compensation-related proposals per year in the 1997–
2002 period (averaging 16.2% votes in favor) compared to about 160
proposals per year in the 2003–2007 period (averaging 28.9% votes in
favor; Ertimur et al., 2011). New types of shareholder proposals emerged
(e.g., proposals to introduce performance-based vesting conditions in
equity grants, to expense stock options, to subject severance payments
to shareholder approval), gaining higher voting support. While these
2The percentage of all shareholder proposals filed by union pension funds
increased from 13.6% in 1997 to 43.6% in 2003, when union pension funds surpassed
individual investors in terms of number of proposal (Ertimur et al., 2010). Not
surprisingly, executive pay became a central focus of unions’ activism.
4.1. A brief history of Say on Pay 59
votes were non-binding, firms began to respond, particularly when votes
were withheld from compensation committee members up for re-election
(Del Guercio et al., 2008; Cai et al., 2009; Ertimur et al., 2011).
Meanwhile, an important development had taken place in the UK. In
2002 the UK government had introduced a mandatory annual advisory
vote on the executive compensation report, known as Say on Pay, largely
in response to a perceived increase in US-style, “fat cat” executive pay
packages among UK firms. During the first Say on Pay proxy season, a
failed Say on Pay vote at Glaxo SmithKline (with 50.7% of the votes cast
against approval of the remuneration report) made headlines around the
world. Shareholders had objected to an estimated £22 million severance
arrangement for the CEO (based on a two-year notice period), lack of
challenging performance targets and the presence of a retesting provision
in the stock option plan.3 Glaxo SmithKline’s board responded to the
vote by launching an extensive consultation process with shareholders
and adjusting the compensation package accordingly (Ferri and Maber,
2013).
In the US, a union pension fund, the American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees took notice of the UK experience
and rallied other activist investors to submit shareholder proposals
requesting the adoption of Say on Pay (Ferri and Weber, 2009). Between
2006 and 2010, more than 250 Say on Pay proposals were submitted and
voted upon, averaging more than 43% votes in favor and often winning
a majority vote, with increasing success over the years (Burns and
Minnick, 2013; Cuñat et al., 2016). High-profile executive pay scandals
(e.g., option backdating, the large severance package awarded to the
CEO Nardelli at Home Depot) helped activists in making their case for
Say on Pay. Policy makers took notice too, and on April 20, 2007, the
House of Representatives passed a Bill requiring a non-binding annual
shareholder vote on executive compensation (hereafter Say on Pay Bill).
On the same day, then-Senator Barack Obama introduced a companion
Bill in the Senate.
3Retesting provisions in the performance-based vesting conditions of equity grants
allow boards to reevaluate in subsequent years performance targets not achieved
during the initial measurement period, rather than allowing the equity grant to lapse.
As such, they were criticized in the UK as a form of “reward for failure”.
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However, it was the financial crisis of 2007–2008 that accelerated
the path toward mandatory adoption of Say on Pay in the US. Growing
income inequality, public outrage over banks’ bailouts and Wall Street
excesses (e.g., the large bonuses paid at AIG), and the perception that
executive pay played a role in inducing excessive risk-taking, pressured
regulators to take action. Many of the legislative proposals discussed
in the House and Senate in 2008 and 2009 contained a Say on Pay
Provision (see Table 1 in Larcker et al., 2011). Holding a Say on Pay
vote was also a mandatory condition for firms to receive funds under
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). During the 2008 campaign,
both Presidential candidates expressed support for Say on Pay.
As these events unfolded, the debate on the merits and drawbacks of
Say on Pay heated up. Critics of Say on Pay argued that, at best, Say on
Pay votes would be ignored (because of their non-binding nature) and,
at worst, would cause directors to pander to shareholders with special
interests or lacking the required expertise and sophistication, ultimately
resulting in the adoption of suboptimal pay practices (Kaplan, 2007;
Bainbridge, 2008). They also cautioned that the high cost of analyzing
executive pay at thousands of firms would lead shareholders to outsource
voting decisions to proxy advisors, who in turn would minimize their
own costs by promoting one-size-fits-all compensation practices which
would hurt firm value (Gordon, 2009). Finally, some predicted that
shareholders would not use the Say on Pay tool, because they already
have tools to express their views on compensation matters, such as the
ability to submit shareholder proposals on compensation and withhold
votes from directors responsible for compensation packages. In contrast,
supporters of Say on Pay argued that enhanced shareholder voice (as
formalized in a Say on Pay vote) and reputation concerns would help
boards overcome psychological barriers to negotiating with CEOs on
behalf of shareholders, resulting in more efficient compensation contracts
and more dialogue between boards and shareholders (Bebchuk, 2007).
They also pointed to growing evidence of shareholders’ sophistication
in casting informed votes. Finally they argued that Say on Pay would
be more effective than shareholder proposals (which are limited to a
single issue) and less disruptive than a confrontational vote against
an otherwise valuable director. More fundamentally, as outlined in
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Section 2, critics and supporters of Say on Pay disagreed on whether
existing compensation contracts were the result of an efficient labor
market for talent or instead the expression of management power over
captive boards.
Finally, on July 21, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereafter
Dodd–Frank Act). One provision of the Act mandated that, beginning
with annual meetings on or after January 21, 2011, US publicly traded
firms must hold a non-binding shareholder vote on executive pay.
Ironically, Say on Pay, a provision designed to provide more alignment
of interests between shareholder and management was adopted as part
of a financial reform package aimed at deterring “excessive” risk taking
(excessive from the point of view of social welfare), which may be the
result of “too much” alignment between shareholders and management.
The US was not the only country to take notice of the UK experience
with Say on Pay. Similar advisory (non-binding) mandatory Say on Pay
votes (on the compensation report) have been mandated in Australia
(2005), Portugal (2010), Italy (2011), Spain (2011), Belgium (2012),
Israel (2012) and France (2014), while Switzerland (2007), Germany
(2010) and Canada (2012) introduced a voluntary Say on Pay regime.
On the other hand of the spectrum, Netherlands (2004), Japan (2005),
Sweden (2005), Denmark (2007), Norway (2007), Finland (2007), and
South Africa (2011) adopted some version of a binding Say on Pay vote
(usually a prospective vote on future compensation policy), which is now
also being considered by the European Union (for more details about the
international development of Say on Pay, see Thomas and Van der Elst
(2015) and Stathopoulos and Voulgaris (2016)).4 Notably, some countries
have already modified their first Say on Pay legislation. Following
a referendum in 2013, in 2015 Switzerland adopted a mandatory,
retroactive binding Say on Pay vote on the compensation amounts.
Interestingly, the final law adopted to implement the referendum also
allows for a prospective vote on a bonus budget for the upcoming year.
In 2013, the UK added to its advisory, backward-looking Say on Pay
4Netherlands adopted a comply-or-explain regime, where firms may opt out of
the Say on Pay vote if there are no significant changes to the remuneration policy.
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vote a binding, forward-looking vote on the proposed compensation
policy (to be held at least once every three years). In 2012 Australia
modified the advisory Say on Pay vote adopted in 2005 to introduce
the so-called “two-strikes” rule, aimed at increasing the effectiveness of
the advisory vote (see Section 4.2.4). Other countries have elements of
both advisory and binding regimes.5
The rapid adoption of different “shades” of Say on Pay around the
world has provided researchers with many opportunities to investigate
this phenomenon. In the next section, we begin to review the empirical
evidence produced by these studies. In doing so, it is important to
appreciate that Say on Pay has come to epitomize a broader movement
toward greater shareholder democracy, beyond the issue of executive
pay.6 As a result, many observers view the successes and failures of Say
on Pay as a window into the potential effects of other reforms aimed at
increasing shareholder power, making the academic research on Say on
Pay (and its review here) all the more relevant.
4.2 The effect of advisory Say on Pay on executive compensation
The most natural question concerning Say on Pay is whether it affects
executive pay. Thus we first review the empirical evidence on its impact
on level and structure of pay (Section 4.2.1) and compensation practices
(Section 4.2.2) in the UK and US, the two countries most analyzed by
researchers. Then, in Section 4.3 we examine the evidence from other
countries (Section 4.2.3), with special emphasis on the two-strike regime
introduced in Australia (Section 4.2.4).
5In Italy the vote is generally advisory, but binding for firms in the financial
sector. In Israel the vote is advisory, but a binding vote is required if the levels of
pay are outside the range allowed under the remuneration policy.
6During this period shareholder activists in the US (unsuccessfully) lobbied for
a proxy access rule that would make it easier for shareholders to oust corporate
directors and nominate their own candidates. At the same time, they pressured
firms to switch from a plurality to a majority voting standard for uncontested
director elections, as a way to increase directors’ accountability and responsiveness
to shareholders (Ertimur et al., 2015).
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4.2.1 Effect on level and composition of executive compensation
Ferri and Maber (2013) examine the adoption of Say on Pay in the UK
in 2002. They report that in most cases shareholders voted in favor of
compensation plans. Failed Say on Pay votes (i.e., more than 50% of
votes against) were rare (2% of the sample), though highly publicized in
the press. However, in the early years of Say on Pay (2003–2004) about
one-fourth of the sample firms received more than 20% of votes against
the compensation plans, a substantial level of voting dissent.
To capture the impact of Say on Pay on CEO pay, Ferri and Maber
(2013) examine the sensitivity of CEO pay to its economic determinants
over the 2000–2005 period (i.e., before and after the adoption of Say
on Pay) and document a significant increase in the sensitivity of CEO
pay to poor performance. Supporting a causal interpretation of this
result, they also find that (i) the increase does not occur for a subset of
UK firms exempted from Say on Pay (firms traded on the Alternative
Investment Market, a sub-market of the London Stock Exchange with
a more flexible regulatory system); (ii) the increase is more pronounced
in firms experiencing high voting dissent and firms with high abnormal
CEO pay before the adoption of Say on Pay. However, they fail to find
an effect of Say on Pay on the level of pay, similar to most other studies
examining Say on Pay in the UK.7
While in the US Say on Pay was mandated by the Dodd–Frank Act,
its implementation was left to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). The final rule, issued in January 2011, exempted “smaller
reporting companies” (i.e., firms with a public float below $75 million)
from the Say on Pay provision for two years. Iliev and Vitanova
(2015) exploit this setting to estimate the effect of Say on Pay on
CEO compensation. In particular, using a regression discontinuity (RD)
design, they compare yearly changes in CEO pay between firms just
above the SEC-imposed threshold and firms just below the threshold
(but otherwise quite similar). They find a 23% relative increase in CEO
pay in the first year post-Say on Pay for firms above the threshold
and thus subject to Say on Pay, driven by a shift from fixed pay to
7Generally similar findings about the effect of Say on Pay in the UK are in Alissa
(2015) and Carter and Zamora (2008) and Conyon and Sadler (2010).
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performance-based pay.8 They argue that the increase in pay may be a
compensation for the greater turnover risk faced by CEOs in a post-Say
on Pay environment (though they do not examine subsequent turnover).
While the identification strategy chosen by the authors has the benefit of
reducing endogeneity issues, it comes with the price of focusing only on
fairly small firms (those around the $75 million public float threshold),
where shareholders may not view excessive CEO pay as a significant
problem in the first place.
Cuñat et al. (2016) use a similar RD design to analyze non-binding
shareholder proposals to adopt Say on Pay in the US (250 proposals
between 2006 and 2010). In particular, they compare firms where the
proposals receive slightly more than 50% of the votes (the threshold
for approval) to otherwise similar firms where the proposals receive
slightly less than 50%.9 Using this approach they conclude that the
passing and adoption of Say on Pay proposals is not associated with
systematic changes in the level of CEO pay nor its composition. However
both Cai and Walkling (2011) and Cuñat et al. (2016) show that firms
targeted by Say on Pay proposals do not exhibit excess CEO pay or
weaker governance.10 Hence, the lack of an effect at these firms may not
be surprising. Also, caution is required in generalizing these findings
to targeted firms away from the 50% threshold (though the authors
show that these firms do not differ in observable characteristics from
those around the threshold) or to firms not targeted by Say on Pay
shareholder proposals (which tend to be substantially smaller).
Correa and Lel (2016) examine the effect of Say on Pay laws on
CEO pay using a large cross-country sample of about 90,000 firm-year
8Iliev and Vitanova (2015) do not examine changes in pay-for-performance
sensitivity.
9Comparing the changes in CEO pay for firms voluntarily adopting Say on Pay
in response to the proposals and firms not adopting Say on Pay would be problematic
since the adoption decision is endogenous. Similarly, since the voting outcome is
endogenous, it would be difficult to compare changes in CEO pay between firms
where the proposal is approved and firms where it is not approved.
10This may appear surprising. However, Ferri and Weber (2009) report that
activists submitting Say on Pay proposals chose to focus on a broad sample of large
firms, rather than target only firms with problematic CEO pay practices, to obtain
greater visibility and to show to policy makers that investors’ support for Say on
Pay was not limited to problematic firms.
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observations from 38 countries, including 11 countries that adopted
an advisory or binding Say on Pay vote between 2001 and 2012.11 In
particular, they compare post-Say on Pay CEO pay at firms of countries
adopting Say on Pay to a control sample which includes all non-Say on
Pay observations (i.e., pre-Say on Pay CEO pay in countries eventually
adopting Say on Pay as well as CEO pay in countries never adopting
Say on Pay). They find that following the adoption of Say on Pay laws:
(i) pay-for-performance sensitivity increases, and (ii) CEO pay growth
rates decline (i.e., CEO pay levels continues to rise in Say on Pay
adopting countries, but at a lower rate). These changes are concentrated
in firms with weak governance and presumably inefficient pay practices
before the adoption of Say on Pay (e.g., firms with high excess CEO
pay, low pay-for-performance sensitivity, high Say on Pay voting dissent,
long CEO tenure, busier and less independent boards), suggesting that
Say on Pay has a greater impact where other governance mechanism
fail. Interestingly, they also document a relative decrease in the CEO
pay slice, i.e., the ratio of CEO pay to the pay of the top five executives,
which may be interpreted as evidence that Say on Pay mainly affected
CEO’s, rather than top executives’, pay.
4.2.2 Effect on compensation practices
Studies of the effect of Say on Pay on level and composition of CEO pay
may not capture important changes to compensation contracts induced
by Say on Pay votes but not reflected in measures of CEO pay. For
example, the introduction of performance-based vesting provisions is
typically not reflected in the estimates of fair value of equity grants
used by researchers in measuring CEO pay. Many other changes (e.g.,
terms of severance packages) will only be reflected in measures of
CEO pay contingent upon the occurrence of certain events. Thus, it is
important to complement the evidence in Section 4.2.1 with an analysis
of firms’ disclosures of changes to observable provisions of compensation
11Australia (2005), Belgium (2012), Italy (2011), Portugal (2010), the UK (2003)
and Unites States (2011) adopted an advisory vote. Denmark (2007), Norway (2007),
South Africa (2011) and Sweden (2005) adopted a binding vote. Netherland adopted
a comply-or-explain version of Say on Pay in 2004, where firms can opt not to have
the vote if there are no significant changes to the remuneration policy.
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contracts. Besides, this approach captures changes that boards explicitly
make in response to Say on Pay, and thus it acts as a reality check on
more indirect, regression-based inferences of the effects of Say on Pay.
Two studies collect data on specific changes made to compensation
contracts explicitly in response to Say on Pay votes in the UK and
the US, using firms’ disclosures in their proxy statements. Ferri and
Maber (2013) examine the compensation reports of a sample of UK
firms before and after the first Say on Pay vote and find that firms
experiencing higher voting dissent were significantly more likely to
remove compensation provisions criticized by investors as “rewards
for failure” relative to a matched sample of firms experiencing lower
dissent.12 For example, among firms with long notice periods (implying
larger severance payments) the percentage of high dissent firms that
shortened them after the vote (80%) was significantly higher than
before the vote (20%) and also significantly higher than among low
dissent firms after the vote (33.3%). Similar findings are reported for
another controversial practice: the presence of retesting provisions in
the performance-based vesting conditions of equity grants. Most firms
indicate that these changes were the result of consultations with their
major institutional investors. Importantly, firms’ responsiveness to Say
on Pay votes was “rewarded” with a substantial increase in favorable Say
on Pay votes at the subsequent annual meeting. Ferri and Maber (2013)
also find that many firms experiencing low voting dissent at the first Say
on Pay vote had removed those provision before the vote,13 highlighting
the importance of accounting for ex ante effects when assessing the
impact of a new regulation.
Ertimur et al. (2013) examine the effect of Say on Pay on com-
pensation practices in the US in 2011, the first proxy season under
mandatory Say on Pay. Their key findings are generally similar to the
evidence from the UK: (i) failed Say on Pay votes were rare (about
2% of the sample), though cases of substantial dissent were more
frequent; (ii) more than 55% of the firms experiencing significant voting
12Sheehan (2007) and Sheehan (2012) also reports examples of firms’ responses
to Say on Pay votes in the UK over the 2003–2005 period.
13In their sample, 70% of low dissent firms shortened their notice periods during
the year before the first Say on Pay vote.
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dissent responded by making material changes to their compensation
plan during the subsequent year (e.g., introduction of performance-
based vesting conditions in equity grants, use of tougher performance
targets, removal of perks and tax gross-ups, removal of controversial
provisions from severance contracts, etc.), usually in consultation with
major institutional investors, and (iii) firms making changes to their
compensation plans received greater voting support at the following
Say on Pay vote.14
Ertimur et al. (2013) also highlight the strong influence of the
recommendations released by proxy advisors (particularly Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS)), with a negative recommendation being
associated with 25% more votes against the compensation plan. Further
evidence of the significant influence of ISS is the striking discontinuity in
the relation between the extent of Say on Pay voting dissent and firms’
responsiveness to the vote: the percentage of firms making compensation
changes in response to Say on Pay votes jumps from 32% to 72% around
the 30% voting dissent threshold. Why? After the 2011 proxy season,
ISS had indicated that firms failing to “adequately” respond to Say on
Pay voting dissent above 30% would receive a negative recommendation
in 2012 on the Say on Pay proposal and on the election of compensation
committee members.
Finally, similar to the UK experience, there is anecdotal evidence
of analogous compensation changes being made by US firms ahead
of the Say on Pay vote, in order to avoid a negative proxy advisor
recommendation and an adverse shareholder vote (Balsam et al., 2016;
Larcker et al., 2015; Thomas et al., 2012).
4.2.3 Effect of advisory Say on Pay votes in countries with concen-
trated ownership structure
In countries with diffuse ownership (such as the US and the UK)
incentive pay has long been used as a means to alleviate the agency costs
arising from the separation of management and ownership. However,
greater use of incentive pay is risky to managers and thus it requires a
14Other studies examining Say on Pay voting patterns and firms’ responses in the
US, with generally similar findings, include Lo et al. (2014), Balsam et al. (2016),
Conyon (2016), Kimbro and Xu (2016), and Collins et al. (2017).
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risk premium, resulting in rising pay levels. The adoption of Say on Pay
in these countries may be viewed as a tool allowing diffuse shareholders
to ensure that incentive pay is properly designed and pay levels are
thus justified. In countries with concentrated ownership, however, the
rationale for the adoption of Say on Pay is less obvious, since controlling
shareholders can directly monitor managers and their compensation
(hence, the lower use of incentive pay and thus the lower executive pay
levels in these countries). Thomas and Van der Elst (2015) posit that
the adoption of Say on Pay in these countries (e.g., Sweden, Germany) is
likely the result of a gradual decrease in ownership concentration, due to
institutional developments and the rise of foreign institutional investors,
as well as social and political pressures due to rising income inequality.
Thomas and Van der Elst (2015) note that in many European countries
Say on Pay was instituted by social democratic parties. Research on
the effect of advisory Say on Pay votes in countries with concentrated
ownership is generally more limited and more qualitative in nature. Yet,
it provides interesting insights into the impact of Say on Pay in regimes
with different institutional characteristics.
In Italy, an advisory Say on Pay vote on the compensation policy
was adopted in 2011. Bruno and Bianconi (2015) analyze the voting
patterns of large Italian companies (Mib 30 index) between 2012 and
2014 and report that most Say on Pay proposals are approved with large
support (over 90% on average). This is not surprising given the highly
concentrated ownership structure. But there is significant dissent among
minority, non-controlling, shareholders, fueled by the growth of foreign
institutional investors and the rise of proxy advisors. For example, only
56% of the minority shareholders’ votes were cast in favor of Say on
Pay proposals in 2012, with numerous cases where the majority of the
minority shareholders voted against Say on Pay. Some of the issues
behind negative recommendations and adverse Say on Pay votes echo
those in the UK and the US (e.g., large severance contracts), while others
are more country-specific (lack of disclosure of performance criteria,
limited information about peers used for benchmarking purposes, short
vesting schedules). As in the US and the UK, firms generally respond
to adverse votes by making changes to their compensation contracts,
resulting in more positive recommendations and voting outcomes in the
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subsequent year; and there is evidence of increasing engagement between
remuneration committees and proxy advisors/institutional investors.
Presumably as a result of these actions, by 2014 the percentage of votes
cast by minority shareholders in favor of compensation reports increased
to 73% (from 56% in 2012). However, Bruno and Bianconi (2015) note
that these effects are limited to large firms. In small firms (representing
the majority of listed firms in Italy), minority shareholders’ dissent has
remained at high levels (above 60%) over the years, an indication of
limited firms’ responsiveness (the authors conjecture this is due to the
lower levels of minority shareholdings, especially by foreign institutional
investors, at smaller firms).
Belcredi et al. (2014) examine the determinants of Say on Pay voting
dissent in 2012 in a sample of about 250 Italian firms and confirm that
poor disclosure of variable pay is among the key reasons behind voting
dissent. Also, voting dissent is higher when turnout by local and foreign
institutional investors at the annual meeting is higher. Interestingly, they
find that dissent is higher when one of the board members is appointed
by minority shareholders (a peculiarity of the Italian setting), perhaps
a proxy for greater shareholders’ activism and/or for more transparent
compensation disclosures (which may facilitate voting decisions).
As noted earlier, in 2010 Germany adopted a voluntary rather
than mandatory Say on Pay regime.15 Powel and Rapp (2015)
examine Germany’s experience with Say on Pay in a sample of
over 1,000 annual meetings between 2010 and 2013. They find
that during this four-year period about half of the firms had at
least one voluntary Say on Pay vote, with the propensity to hold
such vote increasing in firm size, free float and excess pay. Among
firms holding the vote, dissent is higher when excess pay is higher
and in firms with less concentrated ownership. Say on Pay votes
appear to be followed by greater use of performance-based pay
(though the levels of pay are unchanged). Overall, they conclude
that firms use voluntary Say on Pay votes to get pre-approval
15The Say on Pay vote may be demanded by certain shareholders subject to
procedural and ownership requirements, or may occur as a result of a voluntary
decision by the supervisory board. Proposals for a binding vote were rejected by the
German Parliament in 2013.
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for executive remuneration policies when ownership concentration
is low.
To sum up, there are some general patterns in the Say on Pay
experience across most countries: cases of failed votes are rare and
dissent is generally low (but higher than on other items voted upon),
but when dissent is substantial firms are pressured to respond, removing
controversial pay practices and increasing the pay-for-performance
sensitivity.
4.2.4 Say on Pay down under: Australia’s ‘two-strike’ rule
Australia adopted an advisory Say on Pay vote in 2005. Clarkson et al.
(2011) examine ASX 200 firms and document an increase in pay for
performance sensitivity around the adoption of Say on Pay. Sheehan
(2012) examines voting patterns for ASX 200 firms over the period
2005–2008 and finds that (similar to other countries) voting dissent was
generally low, though each year there were few cases of high dissent.
Interestingly, in her qualitative analyses of compensation changes after
the vote, Sheehan (2012) also finds that Australian firms seem to have
made fewer changes than their UK counterparts, and that the rate of
change did not seem to be higher for firms experiencing higher dissent.
Partly as a result of this (perceived) lack of responsiveness to a Say
on Pay vote, in 2011 the Australia government introduced the so-called
“two-strike rule.” Under this rule, after a 25% Say on Pay dissent vote
(a “strike”) firms must explain in the subsequent remuneration reports
any actions taken to address shareholder concerns. If there is a second
“strike” the subsequent year (another dissent vote greater than 25%),
then a resolution (‘spill’ resolution) must be submitted to shareholders
(at the same meeting) to determine whether all directors (other than
the CEO) should stand for re-election (directors typically serve for
three-year terms in Australia). If the spill resolution is approved by a
majority of the eligible votes, then within 90 days the firm must hold an
extraordinary general meeting (“spill” meeting) to re-elect all directors
(except the CEO).16
16Consideration of a spill resolution is allowed only at every second annual general
meeting.
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An important feature of the two-strike rule is that votes cast by
executives and directors are not eligible to be cast on the Say on Pay vote
and on the spill resolution, making it easier for non-insider shareholders
to achieve the thresholds. Effectively, this regime introduces a penalty
for lack of responsiveness to Say on Pay dissent (as evidenced by two
consecutive relatively high dissent votes) and thus is supposed to give
more ‘teeth’ to the non-binding Say on Pay vote and empower minority
shareholders.17 Indeed, Van der Elst (2016) calls for similar mechanisms
to be introduced in other countries with highly concentrated ownership.
Bugeia et al. (2016) examine the effectiveness of the two-strike rule
in a sample of over 5,000 firm-year observations over the 2011–2014
period. While dissent remains generally low, a ‘strike’ (i.e., dissent >
25%) occurs in over 6% of the firm-years. Among firms with a first
strike, about 16% experience a second strike (presumably because not
fully responsive to the first strike). Firms receiving a strike (first or
second) tend to have higher excess CEO pay. The study also find a
decrease in CEO pay growth rate and both total and excess CEO pay
after the first strike, driven by a shift away from equity-based pay,
while the effects of the second strike are unclear and vary depending
on the control sample.18 There is no evidence of a change in pay-for-
performance sensitivity after the first strike and, perhaps surprisingly,
a decrease after the second strike.
A spill resolution passed with a majority vote in 12 of the 51 firms
with two strikes. Of those 12 firms, nine held a vote to re-elect directors,19
which resulted in one firm with a significant shake-up of the board (at the
other eight firms, almost all directors were re-elected). This descriptive
17Another way to look at it is that the two-strike rule effectively introduces a
supermajority requirement (at 75% of eligible votes) for the approval of the Say on
Pay proposal.
18Two other studies examine the two-strike rule. In contrast to Bugeia et al. (2016)
and Grosse et al. (2015) do not find that that total or excess CEO pay predicts a
strike or voting dissent. They also find no change in total CEO pay after a strike,
except for a decline in the bonus component, but they document an increase in the
length of the remuneration report (perhaps suggesting more disclosures). Monem
and Ng (2013) find some evidence of a higher pay-for-performance sensitivity in
first-strike firms that avoided a second strike.
19Two of the other three firms were de-listed or merged; at the third one, all
directors resigned after the spill resolution.
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evidence suggests that rarely shareholders fully carry out the threat of
replacing directors.
The key unanswered question about the two-strike rule is whether
it triggers greater responsiveness to the Say on Pay vote, as intended
by regulators. That is, are firms more likely to make compensation
changes to address shareholder concerns after the “first” strike than
they were under a simple advisory Say on Pay vote? Does the threat
of a spill resolution increase responsiveness? To address this question,
future work would need to hand collect granular data on compensation
changes made in response to relatively high dissent votes before and
after the two-strike rule (as disclosed in firm’s remuneration reports).
In turn, measuring “responsiveness” requires an understanding of the
specific compensation-related concerns underlying the vote. In the
US, Ertimur et al. (2013) use the proxy advisors’ rationale behind
the recommendations to proxy for such concerns. Perhaps a similar
approach may be taken for Australian firms (examining only levels and
composition of pay is unlikely to capture responsiveness). Also, the
two-strike rule requires firms to disclose how they addressed the first
strike in the remuneration report. Thus, coding the information in such
reports would allow to measure responsiveness and provide insights into
the effectiveness of this regime.
Another avenue for future research may be to compare the effective-
ness of the two strike rule in Australia vis-à-vis a simple advisory Say
on Pay regime where proxy advisors may effectively play the role of the
second strike. In the US, as noted in Section 4.2.2, ISS recommends a
withhold recommendation from directors unresponsive to a dissent vote
on Say on Pay greater than 30%. While this is not equivalent to a spill
resolution, it is one mechanism that may give more teeth to a simple
advisory vote.
4.3 The effect of advisory Say on Pay on firm value
Our review of the evidence in Section 4.2 suggests that, in most countries,
Say on Pay votes affected specific compensation practices, pay-for-
performance sensitivity, and, to a lesser extent, the growth rate of CEO
pay. But what was the ultimate effect on firm value? To address this
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question, researchers have mostly used the event study methodology,
focusing on events that increased the likelihood of Say on Pay adoption
at the market or firm level, and on the announcement of compensation
changes driven by actual or expected Say on Pay votes.
4.3.1 Event studies around the adoption of Say on Pay regulations
As mentioned in Section 4.1, on April 20, 2007, the House of Represen-
tatives passed a Say on Pay Bill by a 2–1 margin. On the same day
then-Senator Barack Obama introduced a companion Bill (S.1181) in the
Senate (which was then put on hold by the Senate Banking Committee).
While the Say on Pay Bill’s approval was expected (Democrats were in
control of the House and supported the Bill), the 2–1 margin was
unexpected, suggesting some support for Say on Pay even among
Republicans.
Cai and Walkling (2011) exploit this “surprise” and examine the
market reaction to the House’s approval of the Bill for a sample of firms
in the S&P 1500 index. They document a positive stock price reaction
for firms with greater expected benefits from Say on Pay, namely firms
with more severe compensation problems (e.g., firms with high abnormal
CEO cash pay, firms with sub-optimal pay-for-performance sensitivity)
and firms more likely to respond to a Say on Pay vote (e.g., firms with
a history of shareholders willing to vote against compensation-related
management proposals and firms with a history of responsiveness to
compensation-related shareholder pressure). However, Cai and Walkling
(2011) do not find a significant impact for firms with high abnormal
equity and total CEO pay.
Larcker et al. (2011) also examine the market reaction to the House’s
approval of the Say on Pay Bill (in addition to other regulatory events
related to executive pay and other governance provisions). Similar to
Cai and Walkling (2011), they fail to find a significant impact for firms
with high abnormal total CEO pay (they do not examine the price
reaction for firms with abnormal cash CEO pay or firms with lower
pay–performance sensitivity).
A concern with both studies is that the House’s approval of a Bill
does not guarantee passage in the Senate and approval by the White
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House. In fact the press at the time reported that the prospects of the
Bill in the Senate were uncertain and the Bush White House openly
opposed the Bill (Associated Press, 2007; New York Times, 2007). Thus,
it is not clear the extent to which this event increased the likelihood of
Say on Pay legislation (a premise of both studies). Arguably, as noted in
Section 4.1, the only “event” that substantially increased the likelihood
of mandatory Say on Pay was the financial crisis.
Ferri and Maber (2013) argue that the announcement of the sub-
mission of Say on Pay regulation to the Parliament in the UK in June
2002 offers a more powerful setting for an event study since it was
largely unexpected and increased substantially the probability of Say on
Pay adoption (Parliament’s approval was virtually guaranteed). Using
this event, they document positive abnormal returns for firms with
excess CEO pay combined with poor performance and for firms with
pay practices perceived to weaken the penalties for poor performance
(those practices were often removed in response to Say on Pay votes;
see Section 4.2.2). They interpret their findings as consistent with
shareholders viewing Say on Pay as a value enhancing monitoring tool
for firms with weak pay-to-poor-performance sensitivity.
Finally, Iliev and Vitanova (2015) examine the market reaction
around the announcement of the SEC final Say on Pay rule that on
January 25, 2011 exempted “smaller reporting companies” (i.e., firms
with a public float below $75 million) from adopting Say on Pay for
two years (press reports at the time noted that the exemption could
become permanent). An appealing feature of this setting is that the SEC
decision was an unexpected deviation from the rule proposed in October
2010, under which no publicly traded firm would be exempted. Iliev and
Vitanova (2015) document significantly more negative abnormal returns
for exempted firms, suggesting a positive valuation impact from mandat-
ing Say on Pay. As noted earlier (Section 4.2.1), since exempted firms
are fairly small, the magnitude of the CEO pay problem (if any) cannot
explain the differential market reaction (besides, the same study finds
an increase in CEO pay level in the first year under Say on Pay). Hence
the reason for the observed price reaction remains somewhat unclear.
The authors suggests it may reflect the expected value from greater
communication between investors and boards under a Say on Pay regime.
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4.3.2 Event studies around shareholder proposals to adopt
Say on Pay
As noted in Section 4.1, in 2006 shareholder activists led by union
pension funds began to submit non-binding shareholder proposals to
adopt Say on Pay. Two studies exploit this setting to infer the perceived
value implications of Say on Pay.
Cai and Walkling (2011) examine the market reaction to proxy filings
and annual meetings of 113 firms targeted by shareholder proposals
to adopt Say on Pay between 2006 and 2008. On average, they find
insignificant returns around both the submission of the proposal (proxy
filing date) and the vote (annual meeting date). However, they also
find that when the proposals are filed by union pension funds, the
(insignificant) abnormal returns are more negative than when filed by
other activists and that when the proposal is defeated, the (insignificant)
abnormal returns are more positive than when the proposal is passed (it
is not clear whether this result is driven by union-sponsored proposals).
They interpret these findings as evidence that the market views Say on
Pay proposals filed by union pension funds as driven by special interests
rather than value maximization.20
However, caution is required in interpreting this evidence. First, in
the context of Say on Pay proposals the distinction between union and
non-union proponents is overstated, because virtually all proponents
were coordinated by a group of investors (mostly union pension funds),
which made publicly available a template for Say on Pay proposals and
a list of potential target firms (Ferri and Weber, 2009). Second, the list
of target firms was publicly available months before the proxy filing
dates, so it is not clear whether the proxy statements contained any new
information. Similarly, the voting outcome of the Say on Pay proposals
may largely be anticipated (based on the composition of institutional
20Consistent with this interpretation, the authors also find that Say on Pay
proposals generally targeted larger firms, rather than firms with excessive pay or
lower pay–performance sensitivity. However, as noted by Ferri and Sandino (2009),
activists typically submit shareholder proposals aimed at promoting policy reforms
at a broad sample of large firms rather than the firms that would most benefit from
the proposals, because they believe that showing widespread support for the proposal
across all types of firms enhances its credibility with policy makers.
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owners, proxy advisors’ recommendations, etc.). Finally, the analyses do
not control for other (potentially new) information contained in proxy
statements (e.g., executive compensation report, other items up for a
vote at the annual meeting) or other events occurring at the annual
meeting (e.g., shareholder votes on other items).
Cuñat et al. (2016) also examine the market reaction to the voting
outcome of non-binding shareholder proposals to adopt Say on Pay,
but to alleviate the concerns outlined above they employ a “fuzzy”
regression discontinuity (RD) design, essentially comparing the stock
price reaction to proposals that pass by a small margin to the reaction
to proposals that fail by a small margin (a methodology introduced
by Cuñat et al., 2012). The underlying idea is that firms around the
threshold are likely to have similar characteristics (as the study confirms)
but differ in the likelihood of implementation, which is substantially
higher for proposals passing the threshold (Thomas and Cotter, 2007;
Ertimur et al., 2010). Indeed, the authors show that the likelihood of
subsequently adopting Say on Pay is 40–50% higher when the Say on
Pay proposal passes by a small margin relative to when it fails by a small
margin. Because in these close-call situations the voting outcome is
uncertain, the resolution of this uncertainty (i.e., a pass or fail outcome)
is likely to convey new information about the likelihood of Say on Pay
adoption, making close-call proposals more suitable to an event study.21
Using this RD design, Cuñat et al. (2016) find that on the day of
the vote a Say on Pay proposal that passes by a small margin yields an
abnormal return of 1.8–2.7% relative to one that fails (after controlling
for other proposals voted upon at the same meeting), and estimate
the “full” value of Say on Pay at about 5% (after taking into account
the increase in the probability of implementing Say on Pay).22 Aside
from the issues discussed in Section 4.2.1 (i.e., ability to generalize
the findings to other firms), this estimate seems too large to reflect
the present value of future reductions in excess CEO pay, especially
21Consistent with this observation, the authors find no market reaction to the
voting outcome of Say on Pay proposals away from the threshold.
22Since the outcome of the vote is not binding, the 1.8–2.7% market reaction only
reflects the expected increase in the probability of Say on Pay adoption and thus
understates the value of the Say on Pay provision.
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taking into account that (i) the authors find no evidence of subsequent
changes in levels and composition of CEO pay for the subset of firms
implementing Say on Pay (see Section 4.2.1), and (ii) the sample firms
do not appear to be characterized by excess CEO pay in the first place.
However, the authors report some evidence of significant improvements
in subsequent operating performance and efficiency as a result of passing
Say on Pay proposals. They thus conjecture that the Say on Pay vote
is viewed as a tool to express a vote of confidence in management
performance rather than as a tool to influence compensation practices,
and that the large, positive market reaction perhaps reflects expected
performance improvements under this tighter monitoring regime. While
this is an intriguing idea, it is unclear what additional “teeth” a Say on
Pay vote would provide over other existing voting mechanisms available
to express lack of confidence in management, such as votes on director
elections (Cai et al., 2009).23
4.3.3 Event studies around compensation changes induced
by Say on Pay
Two studies examine announcements of changes to compensation plans
related to Say on Pay as a way to infer its impact on firm value.
Larcker et al. (2015) examine the market reaction to (non-contaminated)
compensation changes disclosed in 8-K filings by Russell 3000 firms
in the US during the year before the first Say on Pay vote. They
find that compensation changes that appear to be made to avoid a
negative proxy advisor’s recommendation, and thus a negative Say on
Pay vote, are associated with a negative abnormal return of –0.44%,
whereas other compensation changes are not associated with a significant
stock price reaction. Ertimur et al. (2013) perform a similar analysis,
focusing, however, on compensation changes made after the first Say
on Pay vote (and explicitly in response to the vote) by firms receiving a
negative recommendation and a high voting dissent in 2011. They fail to
23Outside the US, an event study of interest is in Trottier (2012), who document
a positive stock price reaction around the announcement of “voluntary” adoption of
Say on Pay by seven Canadian banks in 2009, largely in response to (or, in some
cases in anticipation of) a majority vote in favor of shareholder proposals to adopt
Say on Pay presented at the annual meeting.
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find significant abnormal returns, even for the subset of compensation
changes that resulted in a positive recommendation and low dissent
in 2012 (and, thus, were presumably perceived to be adequate and
material by proxy advisors and voting shareholders). Combined, these
studies fail to find evidence that investors perceive Say on Pay-induced
compensation changes as value-increasing.
4.3.4 Non-event studies approaches: Effect of Say on Pay
on Tobin’s Q
An alternative approach to examine the impact of Say on Pay on firm
value is to examine the change in firm value before and after the adoption
of Say on Pay.
As noted in Section 4.2.1, in their cross-country study Correa and
Lel (2013) find that following the adoption of Say on Pay laws: (i) pay-
for-performance sensitivity increases, (ii) CEO pay growth rates decline
and (iii) there is relative decrease in the CEO pay slice. In the same
study, they also examine the change in Tobin’s Q and report a 2.4%
increase in firm value following the adoption of the Say on Pay laws
(relative to non-Say on Pay adopting countries). They acknowledge that
this increase in firm value is too large to be justified by the relative
decrease in CEO pay growth rate (besides, they find that the effect
on firm value is not more pronounced for firms with high CEO pay).
Thus, they make two conjectures about potential reasons for the value
increase. The first (untested) is that the increase in firm value reflects
better alignment of pay and performance. The second is that it captures
the benefits of reduced pay inequality among the top management team.
Consistent with this hypothesis, they find that the firm value increase
is higher when the relative decrease in CEO pay results in a lower pay
differential between CEO and other top managers.
A concern is that higher valuation in countries with Say on Pay
laws may reflect other governance changes introduced at the same time.
While the study controls for other compensation-related laws there may
be other non-compensation regulations introduced with Say on Pay and
with a potentially larger impact on firm value.
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4.4 Binding Say on Pay: Preliminary evidence
Theory suggests that a binding Say on Pay regime may reduce agency
costs, but accentuates hold-up problems. On the one hand, binding
Say on Pay provides shareholders with an enhanced ability to ensure
alignment. On the other hand, when shareholders can (partially) set
pay ex post, this may distort ex ante managerial effort incentives and
undermine the propensity to undertake value-enhancing firm-specific
investments. The question of the impact of a binding pay regime is
not only interesting from a theoretical perspective but also of practical
relevance, as more countries adopt a binding regime or elements of a
binding regime.24 Here we review the (fairly) limited empirical evidence
on binding Say on Pay.
Wagner and Wenk (2017) examine the adoption of binding Say
on Pay in Switzerland, where in March 2013 almost 70% of Swiss
voters approved a constitutional referendum to introduce a binding
retroactive (ex post) Say on Pay vote on the compensation amounts (i.e.,
shareholders would cast a binding vote on the compensation amounts
paid during the previous year). Importantly, the law implementing this
binding Say on Pay regime (introduced in June 2013 and approved
in November 2013) allowed also for a prospective (ex-ante) approach
where shareholders would vote on a bonus budget for the upcoming year.
The authors report that over 98% of the companies opted for a fully or
partially prospective voting system. In particular, about 75% of these
companies vote on all compensation elements in a prospective manner
(sometimes combined with an advisory vote on the compensation report
in the following year), while 25% vote prospectively on base and long-
term compensation and ex-post on the short-term incentives (Wagner
and Wenk, 2017). These findings suggest that the firms were anticipating
that a retroactive vote on the amount of executive compensation could
24According to Wagner and Wenk (2017), Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden
have introduced laws on Say on Pay with partially binding elements. The revised EU
Shareholder Rights Directive, approved by the European Parliament in March 2017,
introduces a Say on Pay vote on the remuneration policy for the board of directors
and the executive management, leaving to each member country discretion as to the
advisory or binding nature of the vote.
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bear the risk of distorting the incentives set by the initial compensation
contract.
Wagner and Wenk (2017) also perform an event study around the
legislative events described earlier. Consistent with the predictions of
our theoretical model in Section 3 and experimental evidence provided
by Göx et al. (2014), they find a negative price reaction around the
referendum in favor of a binding retroactive Say on Pay, especially in
the subset of firms more subject to the potential hold-up problem (e.g.,
firms with younger CEOs, firms with greater cash bonuses). These same
firms experience a more positive reaction to the passage of the law with
the prospective option, consistent with this option ameliorating the
hold-up problem. Wagner and Wenk also find evidence of relatively more
positive price reaction in firms more likely to benefit from shareholders’
intervention in executive pay (i.e., firms with poor performance, firms
without a large blockholder).
In 2013, the UK complemented its existing advisory Say on Pay
regime with a binding prospective vote on the remuneration policies
(not amounts) to be held at least every three years. Some preliminary
evidence in Gerner-Beuerle and Kirchmaier (2016) suggests that both
the advisory votes (on the compensation report) and the binding votes
(on the forward looking policy) appear to be largely driven by the
same factor, i.e., the level of (past or expected) pay, casting doubts on
shareholders’ ability to distinguish the nature of the item voted upon
and/or on the usefulness of the additional binding vote. In particular,
specific features of the remuneration policy do not appear to drive the
binding vote. More work is needed to assess the impact of the additional
binding vote in the UK on pay practices and firm value.
4.5 Other evidence on Say on Pay
While most Say on Pay studies investigate the effect on compensation
or firms value, a few studies have addressed other research questions
related to Say on Pay, such as the frequency of the vote, the director
labor market effects and the impact on CEO turnover.
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4.5.1 Frequency of the Say on Pay Vote
The Dodd–Frank Act mandated not only a Say on Pay vote but also a
non-binding shareholder vote on the frequency of subsequent Say on
Pay votes, with a choice between annual, biennial, or triennial frequency.
In a sample of S&P 1500 firms which held such vote in 2011, Ferri
and Oesch (2016) report that management recommended the annual
frequency in about 61% of the firms, and the triennial frequency in
most of the remaining cases.25 Interestingly, in the first part of the
proxy season management recommended the annual frequency only
at 40% firms, suggesting management’s preference for a less frequent
vote. As the proxy season progressed and shareholders’ support for an
annual vote became apparent, management shifted to recommending
the annual frequency at most firms.
The annual frequency received, on average, 75% of the votes cast and
won the most votes in 90% of the firms. Despite the non-binding nature
of the vote, virtually all firms adopted the frequency that won the most
votes. Ferri and Oesch (2016) also find that, compared to firms adopting
an annual frequency, firms following management’s recommendation
to adopt a triennial frequency were significantly less likely to change
their compensation practices in response to high dissent on the Say on
Pay vote, consistent with the notion that a less frequent vote results in
lower management accountability (the main rationale for shareholders’
support for an annual vote).
The Dodd–Frank Act also states that the vote on the frequency of
future Say on Pay votes must be held every six years. Hence, US firms
held such vote again in 2017. Among the 319 Russell 3000 firms that
adopted a triennial frequency in 2011, 146 firms switched to annual
frequency as a result of the vote, with 127 firms continuing to opt for a
triennial frequency, even though shareholders voted in favor of annual
frequency at 37 of these firms (the remaining 46 firms did not have a
frequency vote yet; Business Wire, 2017).
25Ferri and Oesch (2016) also estimate that a management recommendations move
about 25% of the votes, with the effect increasing in various proxies for management
credibility.
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4.5.2 Say on Pay and director labor market
Brunarski et al. (2016) examine the director labor market consequences
of adverse Say on Pay votes. They find that directors of firms with
large (>30%) voting dissent on Say on Pay in 2011 are more likely to
lose directorships and compensation committee positions at interlocking
firms and (if they did not lose their seat) more likely to receive less
votes when up for re-election at these firms, suggesting ex post settling
up in the labor market for directors and potentially explaining why
boards are responsive to Say on Pay votes in spite of their non-binding
nature.26
Brunarski et al. (2016) also find that interlocking firms experience a
negative stock price reaction on the day of the vote at the focal firm
(i.e., the firm experiencing the large voting dissent), are more likely to
adopt an annual Say on Pay frequency and experience greater dissent
in subsequent Say on Pay votes. Collectively, the authors interpret this
evidence as suggesting that shareholders of interlocking firms re-assess
the interlocked director’s monitoring ability (in view of the large dissent
at the focal firm) with respect to compensation (the negative stock
price reaction) and increase their own monitoring (by selecting a more
frequent vote and scrutinizing carefully the subsequent Say on Pay
proposals).
There is limited evidence of director labor market effects of Say on
Pay votes in other countries. One exception is Bugeia et al. (2016) who
find no evidence of loss in outside directorships after the first or second
“strike” in Australia.
4.5.3 Say on Pay and CEO turnover
After the “resignation” of Citigroup’s CEO Vikram Pandit in October
2012, many observers noted that Pandit’s troubles began with a “failed”
Say on Pay vote in April 2012, where 55% of the votes were cast “against”
the Say on Pay proposal (Stendhal, 2012). This type of anecdotal
26Brunarski et al. (2016) focus on a 30% dissent threshold because of the ISS
policy to issue a negative recommendation in 2012 on the Say on Pay proposal and
on the election of compensation committee members at firms failing to “adequately”
respond to Say on Pay voting dissent above 30% in 2011 (see Section 4.2.2).
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evidence raises the question of whether an adverse Say on Pay vote
increases the likelihood of CEO turnover. In a sample of FTSE 350 UK
firms between 2003 and 2012, Alissa (2015) finds that higher voting
dissent predicts CEO turnover.27 This evidence does not imply that the
vote caused CEO turnover. Most likely, other factors (e.g., shareholder
dissatisfaction with the CEO performance) caused both the high dissent
and CEO turnover. It does suggest, however, that Say on Pay votes
may reflect not only concerns with compensation packages but also
shareholders’ perceptions of management performance.
27Bugeia et al. (2016) report a similar finding in Australia (but only after the
first “strike,” not the second one). In contrast, in their study of close-call shareholder
proposals to adopt Say On Pay, Cuñat et al. (2016) find no evidence of higher CEO
turnover at firms where the proposals passed by a small margin.
5
Final Thoughts and Suggestions
5.1 Lessons learned
Giving shareholders a Say on Pay has been long advocated by those who
regard executive pay as a manifestation of, rather than a solution to, the
agency problem. Legitimated by public concerns about spectacular cases
of apparent excess pay, regulators around the globe have adopted several
versions of Say on Pay along with other regulatory measures intended
to improve the pay setting process and the alignment of executive pay
with shareholder interests.
Yet, it is far from being clear whether the intensified regulation
of executive pay has achieved its asserted objectives or if it rather
represents a symbolic (over-)reaction to some widely discussed corporate
scandals bearing unintended consequences for the shareholders of the
average firm affected by the regulation. Answering this question is
challenging because there is no unique method of measuring the efficiency
of executive compensation arrangements. Even from a purely theoretical
perspective it is difficult to come up with a clear benchmark defining
how the level and the structure of executive pay should be optimized
from a shareholder perspective. The main reason is that the key input
data determining the optimal compensation contract, such as the CEO’s
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productivity, his or her talent, the risk of the firm’s business model, as
well as the functional relation among these variables and the relevant
performance measures are highly individual- or firm-specific.1 Moreover,
the analysis of Section 2 shows that the question of how a “poor”
corporate governance shapes the structure of compensation contracts
not only depends on the specific parameters of the contracting problem
but also on the relevant set of constraints faced by the firm. More
fundamentally, it is even not obvious that a management-friendly
compensation policy is always associated with a net loss for the firm’s
shareholders because a management-friendly board or compensation
committee can often provide benefits that a shareholder-friendly board
cannot deliver.
The ambiguity in evaluating the efficiency of compensation arrange-
ments has important consequences for the analysis of Say on Pay. If
shareholders can clearly identify inefficient compensation policies, Say
on Pay bears the potential of providing a net benefit to shareholders.
Otherwise, even the threat of an advisory Say on Pay proposal can
lead a shareholder-friendly board to deviate from the shareholder
value maximizing compensation plan in order to avoid the adverse
consequences of the shareholder verdict against its compensation policy.
If the vote on the Say on Pay proposal is binding and takes place after
the CEO has decided on potentially value-increasing activities, Say on
Pay can even undermine the CEO’s incentives to create shareholder
value if he anticipates that the shareholders might use the Say on Pay
proposal to enforce a retroactive pay cut.
With respect to the empirical evidence, our review of the literature
identifies a set of key findings. First, across all countries, cases of
failed votes or high voting dissent do happen, suggesting that enough
shareholders are willing to vote against a compensation plan perceived
as sub-optimal. At the same time, such votes are fairly infrequent,
indicating that shareholders, in aggregate, do not believe that abusive
compensation practices are a systemic problem. One interpretation of
this evidence is that concerns with executive pay practices have been
1In addition, these variables are often either unobservable or difficult to measure.
This problem makes the identification of good empirical proxies of efficient (as well
as inefficient) pay practices a challenging task.
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overstated, due to a few “bad apples.” Another one is that most of
the effect of Say on Pay occurs ex ante, with firms reforming practices
ahead of the vote (there is indeed evidence of increasing engagement
with institutional investors prior to the vote). Or, maybe, by the time
Say on Pay was introduced (more than a decade after the Enron-
type scandals that led to calls for greater shareholder voice), most
compensation abuses had been already addressed via other mechanisms
(hedge fund activism, monitoring by institutional investors, vote-no
campaigns against compensation committee members, SEC-mandated
pay disclosures).
Second, there is robust evidence that boards respond to Say on Pay
votes: when shareholders choose to use it, their “voice” is heard. Not
only firms failing to win the Say on Pay vote, but also firms facing
substantial dissent (20–30% of the votes against) make changes to their
compensation plans, often in consultation with institutional investors
and proxy advisors. Hence, the Say on Pay tool can be effective. Third,
institutional investors appear to use the power of Say on Pay votes
to pressure firms into strengthening the perceived link between pay
and performance (by removing or adding specific contract provisions),
rather than to pressure firms to reduce target levels of pay. Consistent
with the above, most studies examining the aggregate effect of Say on
Pay on CEO pay find some increase in pay–performance sensitivity, but
no effect on the level of CEO pay (and only some modest reduction
in the growth rate of CEO pay). Combined, these findings reveal that
institutional investors are generally reluctant to “regulate” executive
pay levels, maybe because they “trust” that the labor market is properly
setting such levels, at least on average.
Finally, the evidence on the effect of Say on Pay on firm value
is mixed. On one hand, a number of studies report a positive stock
price reaction to events announcing the future adoption of Say on
Pay (at the country- or firm-level). Also, Correa and Lel (2016) report
reliable evidence of an increase in Tobin’s Q after the adoption of
Say on Pay laws. On the other hand, many of these studies acknowl-
edge that the effect on CEO pay (if any) is too small to justify the
documented price impact. Also, studies examining actual Say on Pay-
induced compensation changes find either a negative or insignificant
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stock price reaction. One potential explanation for these apparently
conflicting findings is that investors’ (positive) expectations about the
effects of Say on Pay have not materialized. Another explanation is
that those expectations were not driven by anticipated improvements to
compensation contracts but other anticipated effect of Say on Pay (e.g.,
greater pressure on management to perform well to avoid an adverse
vote; better communication between boards and management).
What is the overall lesson from this evidence? Say on Pay has had
some, but modest impact on pay practices and firm value. While some
observers may interpret the lack of an effect on CEO pay levels as
evidence of the failure of Say on Pay, one should note that Say on Pay
per se is a neutral tool. Its impact depends on what investors choose to
say on pay! From this perspective, perhaps the greatest ‘disappointment’
about Say on Pay is that, by and large, it has failed to promote novel
ideas about the design of optimal compensation packages. In many
countries governance codes and associations of institutional investors
have promoted a set of best practices and guidelines. But it is fair
to say that these efforts have had limited success and new models of
compensation have not emerged. Investors have used Say on Pay mostly
as a means to “veto” compensation arrangements with some problematic
features or send a ‘warning’ message to unresponsive boards, rather than
to promote a new model of executive pay. This is not surprising. After
all, as discussed earlier, the design of compensation plans is extremely
complex and, importantly, there is no obvious way to measure, even ex
post, whether a compensation plan “works” (other than by observing
firm performance).
Was the adoption of Say on Pay an “optimal” choice from a social
welfare point of view? This is a difficult question to answer given the
challenges of identifying and measuring all the potential costs and
benefits associated with Say on Pay (likely to change over time and
differ across countries). Perhaps the most positive view of Say on Pay
is that its introduction prevented the adoption of other more radical
and intrusive regulatory measures (e.g., CEO pay caps). In that sense,
it may be viewed as an “optimal” answer (i.e., the lesser of two evils)
to the political pressure to reform executive pay during the financial
crisis. Also, it may have served a positive role in restoring investors’
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confidence in capital markets after a decade of corporate scandals and
financial crises.
5.2 The road ahead
There are several opportunities for further research on Say on Pay.
On the theoretical side, this research could contribute to a broader
understanding of its economic consequences, its cost and benefits
from a shareholder perspective, and provide testable hypotheses for
future empirical research. First of all, it seems interesting to study the
consequences of a management-friendly compensation policy in different
contracting environments. The model in Section 2 seeks to answer this
question in the context of a simple moral hazard problem with a risk
neutral agent protected by limited liability. Risk sharing considerations
and other important determinants of compensation contracts such
as adverse selection problems or career concerns could be fruitfully
integrated into the model to arrive at a richer set of predictions regarding
the consequences of a “poor” governance quality for the level and
structure of executive pay.
A second issue that arises quite naturally in this context are potential
interactions among different regulatory measures and the governance
structure of the firm. In our model, we take the governance structure
as fixed and study the consequences of Say on Pay independent of the
existing regulation. However, it seems natural to ask whether and how
Say on Pay interacts with other regulatory reforms such as compensation
disclosure rules or independence requirements of board and committee
members and to study if these measures are complements or substitutes.
Likewise, it is interesting to study to what extent the presence of Say on
Pay and other regulatory measures renders it optimal for firms to adjust
the composition of its board and/or committees (e.g., Göx, 2016). Last
but not least, it seems promising to provide a theoretical study of the
relation between institutional investors and proxy advisors and their
incentives to produce well informed recommendations for shareholder
votes on Say on Pay proposals.
In terms of further empirical research, we believe there may be three
fruitful avenues of research. The first is to develop more reliable ways to
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assess the ex ante effect of Say on Pay. After all, most of the action may
occur prior to the vote and studies to date have only partially captured
this possibility. The second is to investigate more directly potential side
(non-compensation) effects of the Say on Pay regime. Does the threat
of a highly publicized vote of no-confidence (as reflected in the Say on
Pay vote) motivate boards and managers to perform better? The third
is to exploit the variation in ‘shades’ of Say on Pay across countries
with different institutional arrangements. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, we hope our review encourages empirical researchers to
ground their work in the theory highlighted in Sections 2 and 3, so as to
develop more nuanced and powerful predictions that take into account
the governance structure and other institutional arrangements.
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Appendices
A
Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
With the simplified objective function in (2.7), the board’s maximization
problem can be expressed by the Lagrangian
L = (1 + l2) ·Π(a) + (δ + l1) · U(a), (A.1)
where l1 and l2 are the Lagrangian multipliers for the agent’s and the
principal’s participation constraints in (2.9) and (2.14), respectively.
Using the fact that b = c′(a) from the agent’s incentive constraint (2.10),
the optimal solution must satisfy the following first-order conditions for
the optimal choice of a and w
(1 + l2) · [x′(a)− c′(a)] + (δ + l1 − 1− l2) · a · c′′(a) = 0
δ + l1 − 1− l2 = 0. (A.2)
Since only one of the two participation constraints can be binding,
the program has two solutions. If δ = λ/(1 − λ) ≤ 1, the board’s
objective function is monotonically decreasing in w. Thus, the agent’s
participation constraint must be binding and it holds that w = c(a)−
a · c′(a), l1 = 1− δ, and l2 = 0. If δ > 1, the board’s objective function
is monotonically increasing in w. Thus, the principal’s participation
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constraint must be binding and it holds that w = x(a) − a · c′(a),
l2 = δ − 1, and l1 = 0. In both cases, the optimal effort level satisfies
x′(a) = c′(a).
If the CEO’s compensation is determined by Nash bargaining, the
optimal contract maximizes the Nash product in (2.8). Considering
the agent’s incentive constraint, and maximizing ln(N(a)) yields the
first-order conditions for the optimal choice of a and w
λ ·Π(a) · U ′(a) + (1− λ) · U(a) ·Π′(a) = 0
λ ·Π(a)− (1− λ) · U(a) = 0. (A.3)
Solving these equations for w and a yields the first-best effort level and
the salary in (2.13).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
To solve the problem with the agent’s limited liability constraint, note
first that the agent’s participation constraint in (2.9) cannot be binding
because with a strictly concave cost function, the lease payment in
(2.11) is strictly negative. Accordingly, the Lagrangian of the board’s
maximization problem takes the form
L = (1 + l2) ·Π(a) + δ · U(a) + l3 · (w − w), (A.4)
where l2 and l3 are the Lagrangian multipliers for the principal’s
participation constraint and the limited liability constraint, respectively.
The optimal choice of a and w must satisfy the first-order condition in
(A.2) and
δ + l3 − 1− l2 = 0.
This problem has two solutions. If δ ≤ 1, it holds that l2 = 0 and
l3 = 1−δ. The salary is determined by the limited liability constraint and
the optimal bonus in (2.17) solves (A.2). If δ > 1, the board implements
the same contract as in Proposition 2.1. Clearly, this solution is only
feasible if w = x(a)− a · x′(a) ≥ w which we assume.
If the CEO’s compensation is determined by Nash bargaining, the
optimal bonus in (2.18) is determined by (A.3) as long as λ · x(a) +
(1− λ) · c(a)− a · x′(a) ≤ w. Otherwise, the board implements the same
contract as in Proposition 2.1.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.7
Suppose that the shareholders can freely choose the composition of the
board before the agent undertakes his search effort. To determine the
optimal value of δ, the shareholder’s maximize their expected profit in
(2.31) anticipating the equilibrium level a(δ) implemented by the board
at the contracting stage and the fact that the agent’s optimal choice of
e must maximize his expected utility in (2.32). The Lagrangian of the
board’s maximization problem takes the form
L = e ·Π(a(δ)) + l · (U(a(δ))− k′(e)), (A.5)
where l is the Lagrangian multiplier for the incentive constraint regarding
the agent’s choice of e. The optimal choice of δ and e must satisfy the
incentive constraint and the first-order conditions
Π(a(δ))− l · k′′(e) = 0 (A.6)[
e ·Π′(a(δ)) + l · U ′(a(δ))] · da
dδ
= 0, (A.7)
where a(δ) is defined by the first-order condition in (A.2) for the weighted
utilities approach and by (A.3) if the bonus is determined by Nash
bargaining.
Consider first the solution of the weighted utilities approach. Since
Π(a(1)) = 0, it must be that δ < 1. Using the fact that Π′(a(δ)) =
−δ · U ′(a(δ)) for l2 = 0 from (A.2), condition (A.7) can be rewritten as
[l − e · δ] · U ′(a(δ)) · da
dδ
.
Since this expression is positive if δ = 0 , it must be that δ ∈ (0, 1).
Solving (A.6) for l yields the expression in (2.33). The proof for the
Nash bargaining case is similar but since Π(a(1)) > 0, the optimal value
of δ is positive but not necessarily smaller than 1.
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